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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the secretary problem using a twofold ap-
proach: compare the performance of models adopting diﬀerent degrees of complexity
and validate the results testing which of them ﬁts behavioural data the best.
From a theoretical point of view we modify two of the main assumptions of the tra-
ditional secretary problem. We use absolute values randomly drawn from a normal
distribution instead of rankings for the applicants and remove the constraining 0-1
utility function. In this way the goal is to maximize the expected gain instead of
the probability of picking the highest value within a sequence of alternatives.
This problem is less rigid than the traditional one and allows picking non-candidate
options. We believe this variation can model some real choice situations such as lim-
ited time oﬀers and decisions involving economic variables characterized by stochas-
tic ﬂuctuations.
We initially consider previously studied heuristics and modify them in order to
study the performance in case they accept second-best options. After that we solve
the problem using a computational demanding dynamic threshold model that up-
dates information using observed alternative.
Additionally, we design two new heuristics, called cutoﬀ-threshold and maximum-
threshold rule, that include features of both previous heuristics and threshold model.
120 subjects participated in an optimal stopping experiment with 30 diﬀerent se-
quences and various tests measuring intelligence, working memory and risk aversion.
Our cutoﬀ-threshold rule ﬁts behavioural data better than all the other models,
showing the preliminary role of exploration and the trade-oﬀ between the optimal
policy and the already identiﬁed heuristic. Additionally we study the learning pro-
cess during the task and the role of intelligence of participants. Results conﬁrm
previous studies on the role of intelligence as major predictor of performance, both
as value earned and precision of the model adopted.
KEYWORDS: Optimal stopping, Behavioural economics, Heuristics, Threshold, In-
telligence, Learning
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1 General introduction
Economics is the discipline that studies choices.
Consumption, production and investment choices. Political, ﬁscal and social choices.
In each of these cases there are diﬀerent options, and the decision maker selects one
among them in order to pursuit her goal.
Decision problems are usually described using mathematical language in order to
characterize optimal solution. Real problems are simpliﬁed assuming perfect knowl-
edge about all the available alternatives. When stochasticity is introduced we use
laws that describe the degree of uncertainty, avoiding ambiguity.
In order to show a simpliﬁed case we propose a textbook example.
Shopping situation is an archetypical case of decision problem: if you go to the
supermarket to buy a chocolate bar you will reach the appropriate shelf and check
all the available varieties. They can diﬀer by cocoa percentage, ﬂavour, size, price.
Given your taste, willingness to pay (and gluttony) you will chose one (or more!)
among the chocolate bars. Economic theory tells us that you are trying to maximize
a ﬁctitious utility function under perfect knowledge of the alternatives and unlimited
memory and computational ability. Actually the choice scenario described above is
less obvious than we could expect at a ﬁrst sight.
To take a perfectly informed decision we need to check all the diﬀerent options,
compare them on more dimensions, and remember all these information.
To do this we need, ﬁrst of all, plenty of time.
In the real world, given the same shopping situation, we could answer in diﬀerent
ways. For example we could buy a certain product because we use to do so or a
friend suggested us, because there is only one option close to our desire, or just pick
a random one. We cannot ex-ante be sure these strategies correspond to maximizing
choices.
Virtual and real auctions represent a clear example of choice with non-traditional
features. In these situations bidders need to take fast decisions and there is a com-
petition with other potential buyers, so the bids take into account many factors
including expected replies by the other bidders.
Information about the product sold may be partial, or at least not so detailed as in
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the case of a chocolate bar or a bottle of shampoo at the supermarket.
Finally we can consider the case of booking a ﬂight. The decision maker knows
the destination and the dates she desires to ﬂy, so it is easy to ﬁnd the solution
with the best price among diﬀerent companies. The only information that is not
available is how much prices will change tomorrow, or the day after, and so on until
the day of the departure. The price can both rise or fall, but once you bought your
ticket it is not possible to take advantage of a more convenient oﬀer.
All these typologies of decision framework and many others show characteristics
that diﬀer from the traditional choice problem, as described in the chocolate exam-
ple. It is not always possible to get the best option, or forecast the best moment to
place an oﬀer, given available information.
Researchers put a lot of eﬀort in the design of more complex problems and solutions.
On one side it is possible to include limited information, or partial information with
the possibility to improve the knowledge, for example putting some eﬀort in a costly
search activity.
On the other side, time plays a crucial role. So-called recall option, i.e. the possi-
bility to change your mind and accept something you refused before, can be absent
or limited. For example you can consider interest rates on diﬀerent home mortgages
and try to ﬁnd the lowest rate. Interest rates, like many other economic variables,
are characterized by stochastic ﬂuctuations. If rate increases you cannot return to
older, lower one.
One of the goals of search theory is to explain how individuals behave when they
have imperfect or incomplete market information.
In particular, we decide to focus on the so-called secretary problem, an optimal
stopping problem that represents an hiring situation: the decision maker chooses
when she wants to terminate the search by hiring an applicant, and gives up the
opportunity of hiring another applicant potentially better, who has yet to be inter-
viewed.
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The ﬁrst statement of the problem appeared in the February 1960 column of Martin
Gardner in Scientiﬁc American. Lindley (1961) solved the problem ﬁrst in a scien-
tiﬁc journal, and three years later Chow et al. (1964) generalized the solution.
Since then researchers studied many variations on the traditional problem. Results
change according to the assumptions of the problem, for example full, partial or no
information, research costs and structure of the utility function. Seale and Rapoport
(1997) designed three main heuristics to describe human behaviour in a task corre-
sponding to the problem. These rules, called cutoﬀ rule, candidate count rule and
successive non-candidate rule, are used in all the situations with no information,
where relative ranking is the only crucial element used to choose.
Diﬀerent assumptions about the distribution of applicants and utility functions (as
in Muller 2000, or Costa and Averbeck 2015) bring to a distinct solution model based
on acceptance regions.
In our problem we operate two main changes on the assumptions of the traditional
secretary problem. First of all we substitute the relative ranking information with
cardinal values. The values are randomly picked from a normal distribution whose
parameters are not known. The decision maker can gain information and estimate
mean and variance by observing the applicants. Hence we describe a partial infor-
mation problem.
The second element is given by the utility function (or, to be more precise, the gain
function) assigned to the decision maker. In the traditional problem there is a 0-1
utility function: picking the best is the only goal and choosing the second best is
considered as bad as picking the worst one. Here we reward the decision maker with
exactly the same cardinal value she chose.
We believe that applying these two modiﬁcations1 we obtain a more appropriate
framework to describe simpliﬁed economic choice situations.
First of all we allow learning during the single sequence: at the beginning of a se-
quence we start with no information, and our conﬁdence over the estimates improves
1We are actually modifying three of the assumptions, as the ﬁrst change aﬀects two separate
aspects (data generation and information given to the decision maker).
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during the task because of the higher number of applicants met.2
Second, absolute values play a role. When we compare two results we are interested
not only in the ranking but also in the distance between them.
Finally we do not limit our pursuit to the choice of the best one. Relaxing this
assumption means allowing a higher heterogeneity in the choices. In the traditional
version of the problem the selection of a non-candidate applicant, i.e. an appli-
cant that is not the best one met so far, is considered as a mistake. We want to
include the possibility to choose lower values without a tight classiﬁcation criterion.3
We study the normal-distribution variation of the secretary problem in three steps.
We initially study the performance of old heuristics described in the literature. In
particular we redesign them and allow non-best selection.4 Our analysis shows that
under some conditions the performance of the new rules is no worse than the original.
We also analyze the corresponding optimal strategy. The dynamic threshold model
we describe operates according to the principle of acceptance regions presented by
Muller (2000). If we include uncertainty about the parameters of the distribution,
the optimal policy simultaneously manages the exploration and exploitation aspects.
Each new observation is in the process of estimate of the parameters, and is evalu-
ated as possible choice.
Finally we introduce two new rules. Since the threshold model is very demand-
ing from a computational point of view, we embed some of its features in the new
rules. Cutoﬀ-threshold and maximum-threshold rule are much simpler but their per-
formance are signiﬁcantly higher than traditional heuristics.
In order to test empiric relevance of the newly introduced rules, 120 subjects partici-
2It is important to stress that the design of our task seeks to avoid a priori beliefs about the
unknown parameters. As we discuss later, at the beginning of each sequence the decision maker
has no information about the parameters of current sequence.
3Adopting absolute values we also include heterogeneity driven by risk aversion and attitude to
manage high and low values.
4We compare the models when choice is possible only in correspondence of a best candidate or
in the case second-best or third-best candidates can be selected.
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pated to a paid experiment. Participants solved 30 problems with diﬀerent sequences
and completed diﬀerent questionnaires to measure intelligence (Raven Advance Pro-
gressive Matrices and Cognitive Reﬂection test), risk aversion (Holt & Laury risk
aversion test) and working memory (free recall Working Memory Test and Wechsler
Digit Span test).
Participants were rewarded between 10 and 20 euros according to the accuracy of
their choices in the optimal stopping task under normal-distribution variation.
We analyze performance, waiting time, average gain and number of choices made
according to the described rules.
After that we study the role of intelligence, risk aversion and memory as predictors
of behaviour.
In particular we focus on the role of intelligence and the learning process during the
experiment.
The dissertation is made up of two distinct parts.
The ﬁrst part is dedicated to a review of the literature. We describe the main
features of an optimal stopping problem and in particular the assumptions of the
traditional secretary problem. We show the main heuristics in the literature and
compare their performance. Previous experiments play an important role in the
review of the literature. We recap the main behavioural studies on traditional prob-
lem and its variations. Finally we summarize the tests used during the experiment
in order to measure intelligence, memory and risk aversion, and we brieﬂy discuss
the role of learning.
In the second part of the dissertation we describe our variation of the problem, the
optimal policy and the performance of both old and new heuristics. We discuss the
role of heterogeneity in modelling accuracy and learning.
Finally we describe the experimental paradigm and show behavioural results.
We conclude with a brief discussion about the areas of applications of the problem,
a summary of main results and some possible implementations.
Appendices contain the instructions that subjects received during the experiment
and the pseudo-codes used in the design of models.
11

Part I
Optimal stopping: a review of the
literature
2 Optimal stopping problems
Optimal stopping theory is concerned with problems of choice of the time to take an
action (Ferguson, 1967), and in general with situations of choice among a sequence
of alternatives without recall, in order to maximize an expected reward or minimize
an expected cost in a task with some degree of uncertainty.
Problems of this kind are studied in statistics and operational research, but simpli-
ﬁed cases can be found in everyday life: hire an employee (Stein et al., 2003), replace
a machine (Monahan, 1982), buy an airplane ticket (Shu, 2008), open a champagne
bottle, virtual auctions, mating and stock trading (Rothschild, 1974) are only some
examples.
Stopping problems are deﬁned by two objects:
- a sequence of random variables X1, X2, . . .
- a sequence of real-valued reward functions Y1(X1), Y2(X1, X2), . . .
The problem consists of the choice of the time to stop to maximize the expected re-
ward. For each n = 1, 2, . . . after observing X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xn = xn elements
of the sequence it is possible to stop and receive the known reward yn(x1, ..., xn) or
continue and observe Xn+1.
A stopping rule consists of a sequence of functions of the observed elements, repre-
senting the conditions for stopping:5 φ = (φ1(x1), φ2(x1, x2), ...).
This class of problems usually does not allow free recall option, hence it requires an
algorithm able to sequentially process data. In the machine learning terminology
5In case of a random stopping rule φ represents the probability of stopping.
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this type of algorithms is called on-line algorithms (Rethmann and Wanke, 2001).
This term indicates that the problem is to be solved in real-time without the abil-
ity to have all the data and then determine the solution, which in the best choice
problem case would be trivial.
The two main approaches to solve optimal stropping problems are the martingale
approach6 and the Markovian approach.7 Under certain conditions optimal stop-
ping problems can be described by Markov processes by a measurable function. For
further information see Ferguson (1967) or Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (1999).
Monahan (1982) identiﬁed models and algorithms dealing with partially observ-
able Markov decision processes, a generalization of a Markov decision process which
permits uncertainty regarding the state of a Markov process and allows for state
information acquisition. These models have wide applications in areas such as qual-
ity control, machine maintenance, internal auditing, teaching strategy, search algo-
rithms and even analysis of health-care systems.
An important tool in a vast number of stochastic problems is the Bellman equation
(Bellman, 1957). This equation can be used in a maximization (or minimization)
problem with decisions to be taken at diﬀerent times, optimizing the path with the
recursion of its periods.
6A martingale is a stochastic process for which the expectation of the next value in the sequence
is equal to the present observed value even given knowledge of all past events. The martingale
approach is based on backward induction, for cases in discrete and ﬁnite time, and essential supre-
mum, for discrete and continuous time and ﬁnite or inﬁnite horizon.
7A Markov process is a stochastic process that satisﬁes the Markov property, i.e. the conditional
probability distribution of future states of the process (conditional on both past and present states)
depends only upon the present state, not on the sequence of events that preceded it.
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3 Traditional secretary problem
The secretary problem is a classic example of optimal stopping problem (Lindley
1961, Gilbert and Mosteller 1966). The ﬁrst version of the problem was written by
Martin Gardner, who published it in a 1960 column of Scientiﬁc American.
The name comes from a possible real-world scenario of the problem: trying to hire
the best secretary among a certain number of candidates, with imperfect knowledge
about their quality, adopting sequential interviews, and without recall option.
Given a ﬁnite number of alternatives shown sequentially, the decision maker can
choose whether accept current option or refuse it. The only information available
for each element is its relative quality with respect to previous alternatives met,
assuming the possibility of sorting ex post all the alternatives.
If current alternative is accepted the sequence is immediately stopped and none of
remaining options can be chosen. Otherwise, the sequence continues to the following
alternative and previous ones cannot be selected. The alternatives are ﬁnite, hence
if the decision maker reaches the last one, she is forced to select it.
The assumptions of the secretary problem, as stated by Stein et al. (2003) are:
1. The number of applicants for employment, n, is ﬁnite and known;
2. A single position is available;
3. The n applicants are interviewed (evaluated) sequentially in random order with
each of the n! orderings equally likely;
4. The decision maker can rank order all applicants from best = 1 to worst = n
without ties;
5. Only the relative ranks of the applicants are made known to the decision maker,
rather than a numeric measure of utility;
6. Once rejected, an applicant cannot be recalled;
7. The decision maker's goal is to maximize expected payoﬀ: 1 if the best applicant
is selected, 0 otherwise.
Starting from this basic framework, many variations were implemented: utility func-
tions diﬀerent from classical 0-1, explicit costs for acquiring new information and
absolute values instead of relative rankings are only some of the examples that will
be presented in the following section. Freeman (1983) and Chun (2000) realized two
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reviews of articles that modify one or more of the assumptions listed above.
In all these cases there is a common element: the trade-oﬀ between refusing current
oﬀer, to seek higher values, and accepting it, in the case current option is the best
one or it maximizes expected value. This trade-oﬀ corresponds to the two distinct
phases we can recognize as exploration and exploitation, whose combination repre-
sents a widespread dilemma (for example see March, 1991).
The traditional secretary problem is not only an optimal stopping problem, but also
a best choice problem, because the goal is to select the best one of the n alternatives
(assumption 7). In this cases the maximization of the expected value corresponds
to the maximization of the probability of selecting the best option. This aspect is
ﬁrmly linked with the absence of recall option (assumption 6): without it the prob-
lem could be trivially solved gathering all the data available and choosing the best
option at the end of each sequence.
Among the possible stopping rules, three classes of heuristics (cutoﬀ rule, candi-
date count rule and successive non-candidate rule) were investigated by Seale and
Rapoport (1997, 2000) as descriptive models of the behaviour of subjects who took
part to experiments. All these rules are determined by the value of a single param-
eter, and by the length n of the sequence.
For sake of clarity, we name applicant any element of the sequence, and candi-
date any element greater than all the previous ones.
The cutoﬀ rule consists of ignoring the ﬁrst r − 1 applicants and choosing the ﬁrst
candidate thereafter.
The candidate count rule considers only candidate alternatives; it counts the num-
ber of candidates identiﬁed and selects the c-th candidate.
Successive non-candidate rule (or non-candidate count rule) operates in the opposite
way; it counts the number of non-candidate applicants and selects the ﬁrst candidate
met after an uninterrupted subsequence of k − 1 or more non-candidates.
In all the three cases the last element of the sequence is selected if no applicant sat-
isﬁes the rule. This aspect does not improve the performance of the cutoﬀ model,
whereas it slightly increases the success rate of remaining heuristics. In fact it allows
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the selection of the best option if it occupies the last position of the sequence, even
if it does not satisfy the selection criteria.
The cutoﬀ rule includes the optimal rule, i.e. the rule able to maximize the proba-
bility of picking the best.
We analyze separately each of these three heuristics as descripted in Stein et al.
(2003) with a detailed description of the three rules and the corresponding perfor-
mances.
3.1 Cutoﬀ rule
The cutoﬀ rule applied to the secretary problem consists of ignoring the ﬁrst r − 1
applicants (r ∈ N, r ∈ [1, n] ) and choosing the ﬁrst candidate thereafter.8
Given the value of n, there exist a value of r∗ able to maximize the probability of
choosing the best applicant, and this value corresponds to the best policy. We study
the performance of the rule for all the values r can take, and ﬁnd r∗.
We deﬁne Wn(r) = P (success) as the probability of selecting the best out of n
applicant adopting the cutoﬀ rule with the parameter r.
We know the terminal condition Wn(n+ 1) = 0, i.e. it is impossible that the best is
not included in the sequence of applicants.
For r = 1, 2, ..., n we have
Wn(r) =
1
r
· r
n
+
(
1− 1
r
)
·Wn(r + 1)
The probability that the applicant r is a candidate is 1/r, whereas the probability
that the candidate in position r is the best is r/n. If the element at position r is
not a candidate, we move to applicant r+ 1, adopting the cutoﬀ rule we would have
using r + 1 as value of the parameter.
We can explicitly deﬁne the probability of success as
Wn(r) =
r − 1
n
n∑
k=r
1
k − 1
8We remind that any element of the sequence is an applicant, and we name candidate only
those element greater than all the previous ones.
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To ﬁnd optimal value for r we proceed as in Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) and ap-
proximate Wn(r) for large n in such a way that r/n tends to a given number p that
represents the fraction of applicants to ignore before choosing the ﬁrst candidate
(p ∈ R, p ∈ (0, 1] ).
As n tends to inﬁnite we deﬁne V (p) the probability of success, ∆p = 1
n
, r
n
= p so
1
r
= 1
n·p =
∆p
p
.
We can now rewrite the probability of success as
V (p) = ∆p+ (1− ∆p
p
) · V (p+ ∆p) with terminal condition V (1) = 0.
We can more easily rewrite this expression as V (p+∆p)
p
= 1 + V (p+∆p)−V (p)
∆p
and for ∆p→ 0 we get
V ′(p) = 1− V (p)
p
Finally we solve the diﬀerential equation: V (p) = −p · ln(p).
To ﬁnd the optimal strategy we derive with respect to p and set the ﬁrst order con-
dition V ′(p) = 0. The solution is p∗ = e−1, corresponding to r∗ = N/e.
This value corresponds to a global maximum because V ′′(p) = −1/p < 0, so the
function is concave.
We can recognise this result intuitively in the graph below (from Stein et al., 2003).
Figure 1: Performance of cutoﬀ rule for diﬀerent values of p
In the ﬁgure we can see the plot of the success probability V (p) with respect to the
proportion p of applicants skipped in the cases of n = 80 and for large n (generally
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n > 200). The plot is almost ﬂat in correspondence of the peak, representing just
slightly lower success rates in the neighborhood of the optimal value.
3.2 Candidate count rule
The candidate count rule considers only candidate alternatives; it counts the num-
ber of candidates identiﬁed from the beginning of the sequence and selects the c-th
candidate (c ∈ N, r ∈ [1, n] ). No applicant is ignored using this rule.
We deﬁne g(i, j), 1 < i ≤ j ≤ n the probability that there are exactly i candi-
dates among the ﬁrst j applicants (considering a given number n of elements in the
sequence).
g(i, j) is computed for all the feasible combinations of i and j.9
The condition that deﬁnes whether applicant j is a candidate is:
P (i candidates in the ﬁrst j) =
= P (i− 1 cand in j − 1, j cand) + P (i cand in j − 1, j not cand)
We can hence write this expression as
g(i, j) =
1
j
· g(i− 1, j − 1) +
(
1− 1
j
)
· g(i, j − 1) for 1 < i ≤ j ≤ n
and since g(j, j − 1) = 0 (it is impossible to have more candidates than applicants)
we obtain
g(j, j) =
1
j
· g(j − 1, j − 1) for 1 < j ≤ n
We know g(0, j − 1) = 0 so we get
g(1, 1) =
(
1− 1
j
)
· g(1, j − 1) for 1 < j ≤ n
Applicant 1 is always a candidate so we can impose an initial condition g(1, 1) = 1.
In this way we can start the recursion of the previous equations
g(j, j) =
1
j!
, g(1, j) =
1
j
We have a special case if the ﬁnal applicant happens to be a candidate. In this case
we assume that the candidate is selected even if the decision conditions are not met.
9We introduce the value of the parameter c after all the terms are computed.
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If the last applicant is a candidate it will certainly be the overall best, so it is always
rational to select it.
With the recursive method it is possible to compute g(i, j). Hence we ﬁx a value of
the parameter c. The decision rule will bring to a successful choice if either:
- candidate c occurs in the ﬁrst n − 1 applicants and the candidate is the overall
best one or
- up to c− 1 candidates appear in the ﬁrst n− 1 applicants and the last applicant
is the overall best one.
The probability of success in each of these two cases can be computed as follows:
- there are c−1 candidates in the ﬁrst j−1 applicants and candidate c corresponding
to applicant j is the overall best; we sum the probability over all possible positions
of j
n−1∑
j=c
[
g(c− 1, j − 1) · 1
j
· j
n
]
- there are c−1 or less candidates in the ﬁrst n−1 applicants and the last applicant
n is a candidate which turns out to be the overall best one
c−1∑
i=1
g(i, n− 1) · 1
n
Summing the two separate components we get the probability that the chosen can-
didate is the overall best one
P (success) =
1
n
[ n−1∑
j=c
g(c− 1, j − 1) +
c−1∑
i=1
g(i, n− 1)
]
3.3 Successive non-candidate rule
The successive non-candidate rule counts the number of non-candidate applicants
and selects the ﬁrst candidate met after observing a subsequence of k − 1 or more
successive non-candidates (k ∈ N, k ∈ [1, n]).
The applicant selected in this way is better than at least k − 1 previous items plus
any candidate before. Furthermore, being an heuristic, it captures the desire of
choosing a relatively high value after a suﬃciently long block of non-candidates.
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If we consider ﬁxed values for k and n, we can describe the sequence of numbers as
a Markov chain. At any stage r (total number of applicants interviewed) i is the
current number of successive non-candidate.
If applicant r+ 1 is not a candidate, then i+ 1 is the next state of the system. This
happens with probability 1− 1
r+1
= r
r+1
.
Instead, if the applicant is a candidate (which occurs with probability 1
r+1
we can
face two cases:
- if i < k− 1 this candidate is not selected, the new state of the system is i = 0 and
the sequence continues;
- if i ≥ k − 1 then the candidate is selected and the process stops.10
Let γ(i, r) be the probability of success given the state of the system i at stage
r, with n ﬁxed and known. This function represents the situation where r out of
n applicants were interviewed and the i immediately preceding applicants observed
were non-candidates.
We want to compute the value γ(0, 1) which is the probability of success starting
at the beginning of the problem. The ﬁrst applicant is always a candidate, so the
process always starts in state i = 0 on stage 1. We calculate the values of γ(i, r) in
correspondence to the following stages as intermediate computations:
γ(i, r) =
 1r+1 · γ(0, r + 1) + rr+1 · γ(i+ 1, r + 1) if 0 ≤ i < k − 11
r+1
· γ(s, r + 1) + r
r+1
· γ(i+ 1, r + 1) if k − 1 ≤ i < r − 1
Additionally we add here terminal conditions γ(i, n) = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n − 1 (if
we continue the process until the end of the sequence with a run of non-candidates,
we have selected no candidate so we have no chance of success).
Furthermore, γ(0, n) = 1: the process ends in state 0 at time n if the last applicant
is a candidate but we had not seen enough successive non-candidates (e.g. state i
was less than k − 1 on the previous stage). In this case we are forcing the selection
of a candidate that may appear in correspondence of the last stage n.
As we already noted the last applicant is certainly the best value if it turns out to
10When the candidate is selected the process enters an absorbing state s. A state of a Markov
process is called absorbing if once in that state there is no chance of leaving that state. The existence
of an absorbing state (e.g. choose a candidate and stop the sequence) satisﬁes assumption 6.
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be a candidate.
If we make a selection on stage r + 1 and enter the absorbing state s, the prob-
ability that this candidate is the best one is
γ(s, r + 1) =
r + 1
n
Thus the second equation above can be simpliﬁed to
γ(i, r) =
1
n
+
r
r + 1
· γ(i+ 1, r + 1) if k − 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1
We can treat k− 1 as an absorbing state, since we do not need to diﬀerentiate k− 1
from higher values. Hence
γ(k − 1, r) = 1
n
+
(r
r
+ 1
)
· γ(k − 1, r + 1)
In this way we can recognize γ(k − 1, r − 1) = Wn(r) because γ(k − 1, r − 1) is the
probability of success assuming we start in state k − 1 > 0 after r − 1 applicants.
Applicant r − 1 is not a candidate but the rule will select the next candidate, if
any, from applicants r, r + 1, ..., n. The cutoﬀ rule with parameter r skips the ﬁrst
r−1 applicants and then selects the next candidate after that, thus the two decision
rules will make the same selection from this stage forward. Taking into account
these simpliﬁcations we can rewrite the system as
γ(i, r) =
 1r+1 · γ(0, r + 1) + rr+1 · γ(i+ 1, r + 1) if 0 ≤ i < k − 1Wn(r + 1) if i = k − 1, k ≤ r
for r = 1, ..., n− 1, with γ(i, n) = 0 for all i = 1...k − 1 and γ(0, n) = 1.
Computing the elements in correspondence to all the stages the value for the initial
position γ(0, 1) = P (success) is straightforward.
3.4 Performances of the rules
As we noticed by the description of the rules, the performance of each models de-
pends on the value of the unique parameter.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of success choices in a traditional secretary problem
with n = 100 in correspondence to the diﬀerent level of parameters (r, c or k ac-
cording to the heuristic, within the range [1,100]).
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Figure 2: Performance of cutoﬀ, candidate count and successive non-candidate count
The rules display slightly diﬀerent success values in correspondence of optimal val-
ues of the parameters. In particular, cutoﬀ rule and successive non-candidate rule
diﬀer only by a 7%, while candidate count rule performs 18% worse than the op-
timal policy. Observing this result we remark the performance of cutoﬀ is robust
to the total number of observations, while the performance of the candidate count
rule declines with increasing values of n (0.217 at c = 5, n = 80, 0.174 at c = 6
and n = 500, 0.146 at c = 9 and n = 5000). Hence we conclude this rule produces
only moderately good results for small n, and the performance rapidly declines with
higher number of applicants.
Successive non-candidate rule shows the opposite characteristic. The probability of
success signiﬁcantly increases moving from a low value of observations: with n = 6
and k = 3 P (success) = γ(0, 1) = 0.275, for n = 5000 and k = 977 γ(0, 1) = 0.3476,
a probability of success of the best application at about 94% of the optimal value
of cutoﬀ with the fraction e−1.
If we adopt the fraction p = k
n
for successive non-candidates,11 we can deﬁne the
11We deﬁne fraction p with n suﬃciently high.
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result in terms of p: wait for a run of non-candidates equal to the proportion p of
all applicants available, then pick the ﬁrst candidate. If p∗ = 977
5000
= 0.1954 is used,
then the probability of success is maximized within this class of heuristics (there is
little variation in the optimal p∗ for larger values of n).
Successive non-candidate rule is an excellent heuristic in correspondence to the op-
timal value, with properties similar to the optimal policy, however the heuristic is
considerably more sensitive to departures from its optimal parameter p∗ = 0.1954
than is the cutoﬀ rule, corresponding to lower tolerance for deviations.
Generally we can see the shape of the curves are dramatically diﬀerent. The graph
corresponding to the cutoﬀ rule is smooth on the top. This means the result is very
similar to the optimal policy if the cutoﬀ parameter is in the neighborhood of the
best.
Finally we can compare the performance of each heuristic in correspondence of its
optimal parameter. Table 1 shows the optimal parameter for each rule in the case of
n = 100 observations, success percentage, no choice percentage (i.e. the probability
of reaching the last element of the sequence without ﬁnding any candidate satisﬁcing
the requirements) and average position chosen.
Cutoﬀ Candidate Non-candidate
Optimal parameter r = 28 c = 6 k = 5
Success % 31 21 28
No choice % 30 39 32
Average position 51 63 56
Table 1: Performance of heuristics, values for n=100 and 100,000 simulations
On average we can see not only the success rate is diﬀerent, but also the other
characteristics. In particular the average position is higher in correspondence of the
candidate count rule with respect to competing models.
24
4 Experiments and variations of the problem
Since the Seventies, researchers run many experiments in order to test human be-
haviour and ability to act accordingly to optimal policy. Most of the studies about
optimal stopping show a general tendency to early stopping. Decision makers choose
a value before ﬁnishing the exploration share of the sequence according to cutoﬀ
model. This behaviour causes a suboptimal result due to the lack of analysis of the
distribution of alternatives.
Late stopping, the opposite result, is found in the experiments where subjects know
the distribution of options and in particular are informed about an hypothetical
ideal alternative.
In Section 3 we described the seven assumptions of the traditional secretary problem.
Each of them can be relaxed in diﬀerent ways. Variations on the traditional task
have an impact on the optimal policy and in some cases subjects act diﬀerently.
Diﬀerent assumptions oﬀer more realistic formulation of the standards problem.
Rather than assuming a single position Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) and Sakaguchi
(1979) consider a secretary problem in which more positions are available.
Pressman and Sonin (1972), Rasmussen and Robbins (1975) and Gianini-Pettit
(1979) consider the case where the decision maker only knows the distribution of
the value of n.
The assumption of random arrival of applicants can be replaced by other assump-
tions; Cowan and Zabezyk (1978) assume applicants are interviewed at time points
of a Poisson process. Relative rank can be replaced by other assumptions, probabil-
ity distribution can be known in advance or it can be learned during the interview
(Sakaguchi 1979, Gilbert and Mosteller 1966, De Groot 1970, Stewart 1981, Petruc-
celli 1982).
The absence of recall option can be generalized in several diﬀerent ways. Smith
(1975) introduced the possibility that an applicant, if selected, has some probability
of not being available. Another generalization allows the recall of one of the last m
rejected applicants, and it can be selected only if it is still available.
Assumption about the 0-1 utility function can be generalized in several ways. The
decision maker can receive utility ui if the applicant selects the i-th best, or directly
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receive a value proportional to the cardinal number she chose.
To show the results of main experiments we divide this section into three parts.
In the ﬁrst one we describe the ﬁrst experiments and the main evidences from tasks
with the assumptions described in the traditional version of the secretary problem.
After that we show some variations on the assumptions and how they can impact
behavioural results. Finally we show some of the insights about more radical varia-
tions on the problem, such as group version of the secretary problem, multi-attribute
implementation and neural studies.
4.1 First experiments and main evidences
Rapoport and Tversky (1970) run the ﬁrst experiment about search costs using the
secretary problem framework. In their task they used sequences with oﬀers ran-
domly drawn from normal distributions whose parameter values were known. On
each trial the decision maker could either pay a ﬁxed cost and sample another oﬀer
or stop the search and receive a payoﬀ equal to value of last oﬀer minus the total
cost of search. Seven subjects took part to the experiment within a study about
distribution detection. Throughout the ﬁrst period they participated in a signal
detection experiment and they were asked to distinguish two normal distribution
with mean 1630 or 1797 and common standard deviation equal to 167. During the
last period of experiment they took part to the optimal stopping study.
The two diﬀerent distributions were known, n was bounded and known, decision
makers saw all the values even after choice.
The experiment was conducted under diﬀerent conditions: with and without recall
option, using diﬀerent length of the sequence (8 or 24), and diﬀerent constant cost
conditions (including no cost).
Behavioural data show that decision makers solved most of the problems optimally,
but in general subjects tended to stop earlier than predicted by optimal policy.
Rapoport and Tversky compared the choices with a cutoﬀ point rule, as the sub-
jects should stop the search whenever an oﬀer exceeds some ﬁxed cutoﬀ (threshold
value).
Results are aligned with the model studied by Kahan et al. (1967). According to
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their study the point is selected at the beginning of each problem and is allowed
to vary from one problem to another. In this task a diﬀerent cutoﬀ point can be
selected for every length n and every cost condition c, and the decision maker stops
the search on a given trial with the ﬁrst oﬀer whose value exceeds the predetermined
cutoﬀ point. If no value is observed the decision maker should continue sampling
until the last stage. A weaker version of the model allows the decision maker to
change the point at the beginning of every trial. In this way it is possible to ex-
plain about 90% of the choices. Some common behaviours cannot explained by this
model. In case of recall option subjects sometimes refuse a value and then change
their mind and take it back. Even when recall option is not allowed decision makers
can refuse a value, then choose a lower value later in the sequence, paying extra
search costs.
This experiment is one of the ﬁrst behavioural studies on this topic. The concept
of cutoﬀ point is similar to the threshold value we describe in case of perfect knowl-
edge about the distribution. The task is not a best choice problem, and does not
contain an exploration part. The design of the experiment wants to test Kahan
decision model, but the weak version does not specify if changes in the cutoﬀ point
are explained as computational ability, learning process or endogenous risk aversion.
Kogut (1990) presented a problem of search for low prices. Given diﬀerent prices
of a product randomly drawn from a known distribution, the problem includes a
constant cost of search and perfect recall. Assuming risk neutrality, results show
again systematic early stopping.
As in previous experiment the search should continue until the point where marginal
costs are greater than marginal beneﬁts. The task asked to search for the lower price
or the highest wage from a distribution of oﬀers. Values were randomly generated
from a known uniform distribution of ten prices. Subjects had to buy the product
and resell it at a constant price (1.50 dollars).
To test whether searching behaviour is inﬂuenced by sunk cost, i.e. the resources
already spent on an activity, diﬀerent conditions were adopted. The baseline cost
for a new observation was 0.08 dollars. Adding a further cost for the ﬁrst search
(equal to 0.40 dollars) should have no impact on the choices. Results show previ-
ously born cost are not ignored, and subjects tend to continue searching as proﬁts
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fall and recall later during the task. Decisions seem to be based on a total rather
than a marginal value, in contrast to the theoretical prediction.
Related literature explain sunk costs inﬂuence decisions in two distinct ways: the
evidence show that with sunk costs individuals are more likely to abandon their
search (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) rather than more strongly committed to it
(Thaler, 1980). Subjects stopped early 38% of times with respect to optimal choices,
risk aversion is a possible explanation.
The exploration-exploitation scenario was ﬁrstly proposed by Stigler (1961). In
its model the decision maker visits n stores, obtains a price quotation from each one
and then buys from the lowest-price store. Given a distribution of prices and the
cost for acquiring new information, the search should stop when the cost is greater
than the expected gain for searching a new shop. This value depends from the cost
of search c and the distribution of prices (that is assumed known). The key concept
of "reservation price" is used to deﬁne a sequential optimal rule that describes the
ex-ante number of shops the decision maker should decide to visit.
The expected gain for searching after n observations is Gn. The decision makers
should choose n so that Gn ≥ c > Gn+1. Decreasing the cost of search or increasing
price dispersion rises the intensity of search, i.e. it increases the number of shops to
visit.
Kahan et al. (1987) tested the eﬀect of diﬀerent distributions in the optimal stop-
ping problem and the role of individual or group task. In this case the task is very
close to the problem described in the traditional version of the secretary problem.
Subjects had to ﬁnd the largest of a set of 200 diﬀerent numbers sampled from one
of three distributions: a triangular distribution with positive skew (beta distribution
with parameters a=1, b=2), one with negative skew (beta distribution with a=2,
b=1) and a rectangular distribution (beta distribution with a=1, b=1). All the
distributions were adjusted to have mean 1250, with standard deviations 884, 442
and 722 respectively. The task was performed individually or in small groups.
Numbers were written on cards and participants won 2 dollars every time they chose
the highest card. The distribution adopted was not known in this problem. On av-
erage participants observed over 150 on 200 before choice in group conditions and
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120 in individual condition. The diﬀerence between group and individual condition
is signiﬁcant. Values of average waiting were not not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent under
the three conditions of distribution.
Results show late stopping: only 12 out of the 88 participants chose a value previous
to position 74 (i.e. the value 200
e
corresponding to the cutoﬀ position to move from
exploration to exploitation parts of the problem) and almost half of the participants
did not choose early enough and did not pick any candidate, reaching the end of the
sequence.
In order to explain results the authors propose a very broad subjective-cutoﬀ model
tested with an arbitrarily selected cutoﬀ between 20 and 100. This general model
is able to explain 85% of choices. Main violations to the model include selecting an
early candidate in a position before 20, select an applicant that is not a candidate,
or reject a candidate observed after position 100.
Seale and Rapoport (1997) compared the ability of the main heuristics (cutoﬀ, can-
didate count and successive non-candidate rules) to ﬁt behavioural data in a task
with all the main features of the traditional problem: maximize the probability of
selecting the best observation from a ﬁnite set of alternatives inspected sequentially.
50 subjects took part to the experiment under two conditions about the length of
the distribution (n = 40 and n = 80) and run 100 trials. In case of best choice they
received immediate conﬁrm they chose the top ranked option and won 0.30 dollars
in case n = 40 or 0.50 dollars for n = 80.
Despite many answers can be done according to more than one heuristic, result
support the cutoﬀ decision rule as the most adopted model. Authors use the term
cutoﬀ threshold value in the description of the model. The term threshold used
here has a diﬀerent meaning with respect to what we use later in our model.
On average subjects performed well and selected the best candidate 31.9% of the
times. This compares to a success rate of 37.2% if they had known and used the
optimal strategy. Subjects tended to select a candidate too early in the process,
waiting on average 21% of time instead of 37% as prescribed by optimal policy.
The early stopping eﬀect is conﬁrmed by the overall cutoﬀ value adopted: 13 instead
of 16 for n = 40 and 21 instead of 30 for n = 80.
Data show learning eﬀect only under condition n = 40: there is a signiﬁcant block
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eﬀect, and 15 out of 25 subjects moved closer to optimal solution comparing two
halves of the task.
4.2 Experiments with variations on the assumptions
Seale and Rapoport (2000) introduced an experiment where the number of appli-
cants is ﬁnite but unknown.
In this secretary problem with uncertainty the decision maker knows the a priori
distribution of the number n.
50 subjects run 100 trials under two condition (maximum number of applicants
n = 40 or 120). The actual number of applicants m was randomly and indepen-
dently drawn on each trial and could assume any value between 1 and n with equal
probability.
The optimal policy for this problem suggests to observe a fraction of applicants
equal to r
∗
n
= 1
e2
= 0.135 with a probability of success that approaches 2
e2
= 0.2707
(Presman and Sonin, 1972).
If the applicant accepted by the subject was the top ranked one, the subject was
paid 0.30 dollars for the trial, otherwise she was not paid at all. Results show no
learning eﬀect under both the conditions. Furthermore there is a strong early stop-
ping bias. Authors explain it as an endogenous ﬁxed cost per observation.
In the experiment designed by Rothschild (1974) decision makers learned about
the probability distribution while they searched for it. At the beginning of each
task the probability distribution from which they are searching is unknown. Ob-
serving values from a distribution it is possible to estimate the parameters. The
author showed the qualitative properties of optimal search strategies are in many
instances the same as in the simpler case when the distribution is assumed known.
After every price quotation the decision maker can accept current value or pay an
amount c to receive another price quotation, with no privilege of recall. Rothschild
assumes the decision maker has a prior distribution and as the search continues she
gathers more information about the distribution of prices, which she assimilates by
using his prior according to Bayes's rule.
If the knowledge of prices is represented by the parameters µ, ρ which are updated
after each new information, the optimal strategy is calculated by induction. Since
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the correct distribution of prices is unknown, acceptable regions of price change as
information increase, so that optimal Bayesian search procedure cannot be charac-
terized by a single reservation price, as it is with the known distribution.
In our problem we operate in a slightly diﬀerent way. We do not assume any prior
about the parameters of the distribution and do not include search costs.
Bearden (2006) adopted rank-based selection and cardinal payoﬀs as an extension
of the secretary problem.
The decision maker can observe up to n applicants whose values are random vari-
ables drawn from an uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. She receives a payoﬀ
xt, the realization of random variable Xt, for selecting the t-th applicant. For each
encountered applicant she learns whether it is the best so far. It is important to
stress that this information is diﬀerent from the relative position. We can say that
the decision maker receives the information It = 1 if the value is a candidate, It = 0
otherwise.
The objective is the maximization of the expected payoﬀ. Diﬀerently from tradi-
tional problem this is not a pick-the-best task. The decision maker gets the true
value she chose. Since the values are drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1] the
expected value of a candidate in position t is Et = E(Xt|It = 1) = tt+1 .
Since dEt
dt
> 0, if it is optimal to select an applicant with It = 1 then it is optimal
to select an applicant with It+k = 1, for every k ≥ 0. Hence it is never optimal to
select an applicant with It = 0.
The optimal solution for this problem is given by a certain cutoﬀ position c∗n corre-
sponding to the optimal value V ∗n = Vn(c
∗
n).
The optimal policy for this problem is slightly diﬀerent from the traditional prob-
lem. The decision maker should skip the ﬁrst
√
n− 1 applicants, then select the
next encountered applicant whose value is a maximum.
The author states that the payoﬀ scheme he presented is more natural compared
to the classical secretary problem. We claim that the assumptions adopted have
tight limits due to the limited information. As the decision maker does not get the
information about the rank she cannot discriminate if current value is a second or
third best. According to the position within the sequence it could be optimal to
accept a second best observation. This scheme does not admit this case and the
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author does not justiﬁes this strong assumption about limited information.
4.3 Further experiments
Shu (2008) designed a problem of future-biased search with a secretary problem with
a quest for the ideal.
In the experiment participants received an endowment of 9,000 dollars and were
asked to buy 15 tickets with the possibility to use one reward coupon and two 30%
discount coupons. Tickets had diﬀerent prices randomly drawn from a known dis-
tribution of prices. The optimal selection strategy prescribes certain rules in order
to determine the right timing to use the discounts.
According to results subject spent on average more per trial and used the free trip
ticket to save lower value. This bias (use later the tickets and spend more) is a
violation of the usage rules and can be explained as participants are overly focused
with ﬁnding the perfect match.
Two diﬀerent conditions on the task (higher second value and less extreme results)
led to improved performances. This evidences stress the role of focalism.
The optimal policy describes a series of thresholds for the ticket price at which the
free ship should be used in early period. Late stopping phenomenon corresponds
to an extended search beyond optimal endpoints when looking for the best option.
The myopic behaviour can be explained as searchers overestimate the probability of
a desired outcome and underestimate the value of a second-best outcome.
Bearden, Murphy and Rapoport (2005) proposed a multi-attribute extension of the
secretary problem.
In their experiment the decision maker observed the relative ranks in the k attributes
and received a payoﬀ for each attribute, according to the absolute rank.
They run experiments with symmetric and asymmetric payoﬀs with two attributes.
Subjects took part to 100 trials with n = 30 and k = 2 and were paid for a single
randomly selected trial.
The optimal policy for this problem describes a set of cutoﬀs for each feasible pair
of relative ranks. The algorithm accepts an applicant if the expected gain exceeds
a certain threshold depending on payoﬀs and position.
Results show a strong evidence of early stopping, as subjects attribute dispropor-
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tionate weight to select an applicant who is acceptable on both attributes instead of
being high on just one of them. This choice criterion ﬁts a modiﬁed satisfying rule,
that can be considered important in many daily situations.
The authors found a strong learning eﬀect through the task. Regressing the mean
earning for each trial onto the trial numbers indicate earnings increased with expe-
rience. Subjects also tended to search longer with experience, and these evidence
can be linked as subjects seem to have learned that searching longer improves payoﬀs.
Lee and Paradowski (2007) arranged a group decision making experiment.
Groups of ﬁve participants had to choose a value from a sequence of ﬁve random
numbers between 0 and 100 (uniform known distribution). The goal is to choose
the maximum of the sequence without recall.
Group interaction was mediated only by networked computers, with no other free
interaction. After each observation each participant was asked to give an initial
individual decision. Everyone received the recommendations of the other group
members, then the subjects provided a potentially revised decision.
The authors run the experiment under three diﬀerent conditions about the group
interaction and decision: consensus to accept from all group members, majority, or
acceptance of an appointed group leader.
Under some conditions groups signiﬁcantly outperformed even their best members.
Results show people do not often revise their decisions, but in the consensus and
leadership conditions participants were more conservative in their initial decisions.
This conservatism removes the individual bias toward choosing values too early in
the sequence.
Only in the majority condition people continued behaving as they did individually
and the group showed the same bias in decision making.
Costa and Averbeck (2015) conducted a neural study in an optimal stopping task.
They collected behavioural and fMRI data during the task designed as a threshold
crossing problems (as a special case of optimal stopping problems, see DeGroot,
1970). The values of the threshold deﬁning stopping versus continuing were calcu-
late dynamically after each new piece of information, and the number of remaining
samples was taken into account. As in previous cases the trade-oﬀ between declining
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suﬃcient options to make an informed choice and not missing a good option can be
modelled formally using a Markov decision process.
The participants had to select an high-ranking item from sequential sampling task.
The problem was presented under two conditions about the length of the sequence
(lists of 8 or 12 element).
Participants were rewarded 5 dollars for the best option, 3 dollars for the second
best, 1 dollar for the third best.
Observations were sampled form a Gaussian distribution with a normal-inverse-χ2
prior (Gelman et al., 2004).
The threshold model adopted to explain data was implemented with a cost-to-sample
estimated for each individual subject in order to better ﬁt data. The cost-to-sample
signiﬁcantly improved the model's prediction with respect to the ideal policy in 16
of 32 subjects.
Comparing "take current option" versus "choice to decline it" the neural activa-
tion pattern is similar to a threshold crossing problem. It is possible to distinguish
activations in the anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate, ventral striatum, and
parietal-frontal areas. These brain regions are implicated in reward representations
and encode the threshold crossing that triggers decisions to commit to a choice.
This pattern of activation is highly similar to the activation in Furl and Averbeck
(2011) for a related information sampling task.
Given a set an internal thresholds the decision maker samples until she get an option
that crosses current threshold. Each sample serves both to update one's estimate of
the underlying distribution as well as being a choice candidate.
The utility u of a state s at time n can be described by the model
un(sn) = Maxa∈Asn
{
rn(sn, a) +
∫
pn(j|sn, a) · un+1(j) dj
}
where A is the set of available actions and r is the reward obtained if action a is
taken.
The problem described here is similar to our task. The main diﬀerence is due to the
utility function the authors adopted, with a reward linked to the relative ranking
within the trial.
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Part II
Dynamic threshold models
5 Introduction
In the previous parts we focused on the features of the traditional secretary problem.
Experiments on the basic task enquire the role of waiting time, and many studies
underline that early stopping is the main bias in behavioural data (Rapoport and
Tversky 1970, Seale and Rapoport 1997).
Furthermore, it is not possible to discriminate good from optimal policies, as the
number of best choices is the only index of the performance. In the traditional
framework the decision maker gains no reward for a near miss. In some experi-
ments researchers introduced signiﬁcantly smaller rewards for second best alterna-
tives (Costa and Averbeck 2015).
Finally, in the traditional problem there is no space for learning. Relative ranking
information about the applicants do not require any assumption about the shape of
the originating distribution. Successive observations can be used only to calculate
the probability of picking a candidate and that current candidate is the overall best
option.
The potentiality of an optimal stopping problem allows us to include both these
aspects and enquire their impact on ﬁnal performance.
After a brief recap of the traditional secretary problem we deﬁne the changes in the
assumptions that lead to our normal-distribution variation.
We consider ﬁrst previously studied heuristics (Stein et al., 2003) and compare their
performances adopting the traditional version and in the case we allow non-best
choices.
After that we solve the problem of maximization of the expected gain for each se-
quence, i.e. each trial of the task. To do so we deﬁne a dynamic threshold model
that updates the estimates of the unknown parameters after each observation.
We also design two new heuristics that include features from both threshold model
and previous rules. These heuristics are less demanding from a computational point
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of view but their performance are better than old heuristics because of learning
through observations.
Results collected with the experiment inform us about the aspects we discussed
about in this part.
First, we can test which of the rules we described (old and new ones) ﬁts the best
behavioural data.
Second, we compare behaviour and common biases in this variation with the evi-
dences from the traditional version of the secretary problem.
Third, we use data collected with other tests measuring intelligence, working mem-
ory and risk attitude to study the drivers of the performance, if any.
Finally we enquire the role of learning though the task. If there is an improvement
in the performance, we consider if it is generated by a reduction in the early stopping
bias or by better estimates of the unknown parameters.
We conclude describing some of the areas of application of the results, with particular
reference to ﬁnancial and consumption topics, and a few possible implementations
of the task in order to enquire more detailed aspects of the problem.
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6 Normal-distribution variation
6.1 A brief recap of the traditional secretary problem
Before discussing our variation on the optimal stopping problem we want to brieﬂy
recap the features of the benchmark problem (Stein et al., 2003).
The assumptions of the traditional secretary problem are:
1. The number of applicants for employment, n, is ﬁnite and known;
2. A single position is available;
3. The n applicants are interviewed (evaluated) sequentially in random order with
each of the n! orderings equally likely;
4. The decision maker can rank order all applicants from best = 1 to worst = n
without ties;
5. Only the relative ranks of the applicants are made known to the decision maker,
rather than a numeric measure of utility;
6. Once rejected, an applicant cannot be recalled;
7. The decision maker's goal is to maximize expected payoﬀ: 1 if the best applicant
is selected, 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, we want to remind that unless otherwise indicated there is no explicit
cost in moving from an element to the following one of the sequence.
Among the possible stopping rules, Seale and Rapoport (1997, 2000) investigated
three classes of heuristics as descriptive model of the behaviour of subjects who
took part to an experiment. All these rules are determined by the value of a single
parameter, and by the length n of the sequence.
From now on we use the name applicant to indicate any element of the sequence,
and candidate to deﬁne an element greater than all the previous ones.
The cutoﬀ rule consists of ignoring the ﬁrst r − 1 applicants and choosing the ﬁrst
candidate thereafter.
The candidate count rule considers only candidate alternatives; it counts the num-
ber of candidates identiﬁed and selects the c-th candidate.
Successive non-candidate rule (or non-candidate count rule) operates in the opposite
way; it counts the number of non-candidate applicants and selects the ﬁrst candidate
met after an uninterrupted subsequence of k − 1 or more non-candidates.
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In all the three cases the last element of the sequence is selected if no applicant
satisﬁes the rule.
The cutoﬀ rule includes the optimal rule, i.e. the rule able to maximize the proba-
bility of picking the best under the assumptions listed above.
6.2 An easy variation: maximize the expected value
Before studying the normal-distribution variation, we can start analyzing a simpli-
ﬁed problem, shown in Muller (2000).
The author considers a problem with a ﬁxed number n of alternatives (i.i.d. real
random variables X1, ..., XN) that can be observed sequentially and assumes the
decision maker knows the common distribution of the observations. It is possible
to add a ﬁxed cost c per observation, and this assumption (with c  0) is strictly
necessary if there is no limit to the number of observations available.
The reward for choosing observation i is Ri = Xi − c · i.
In order to solve the problem we have to ﬁnd the optimal sequence of stopping
regions, that is the set of values the optimal policy should accept in each possible
step of the sequence.
It is crucial to stress that we are assuming initial perfect knowledge of the distribu-
tion, and no learning eﬀect occurs during the sequence.
Deﬁning T the random variable corresponding to the position of the value cho-
sen by the stopping rule, and RT the random gain obtained by this stopping rule,
the problem is MaxRT = MaxE(XT − c · T ).
We deﬁne Jk(s) the optimal expected reward if there are still k possible obser-
vations and s is the momentarily available oﬀer.
We can see J0(s) = s and Jk(s) = Max{s, EJk−1(X)− c}.
It is optimal to accept s if and only if s ≥ r∗k ≡ EJk−1(X)− c.
We can calculate reservation level r∗k by recursion:
r∗1 = EX − c and r∗k = EMax{X1, r∗k−1} − c.
Reservation level and optimal expected reward are increasing in k and for k → ∞
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they converge to r∗ and J(s) = Max{s, r∗}.
For simplicity Muller makes some examples in his paper using oﬀers that are uni-
formly distributed on a certain interval.
For example given the interval [0, 100] and a ﬁxed cost c = 2 the reservation levels,
calculated by iteration, are r∗1 = 48, r
∗
2 = 59.52, r
∗
3 = 65.71, ..., r
∗ = 80.
This structure based on reservation levels is similar to our threshold model, but
requires initial perfect knowledge about the distribution. Muller's models ﬁt ex-
perimental data collected by Sonnemans (1998) using a known discrete uniform
distribution in the interval [1, 100].
6.3 Normal-distribution variation and performance of previ-
ous rules
We consider now a more diﬃcult framework. With respect to traditional problem
we change three assumptions.12 First, we use cardinal values instead of rankings.
These values are randomly generated by a normal distribution. Second, the deci-
sion maker knows how values are generated, but does not know the parameters of
the distribution. Mean and variance diﬀer through the sequences, and the decision
maker does not know the range. Third, we substitute the 0-1 utility function with
a linear correspondence between gain and chosen value.
Like in previous variation on the problem we observe absolute values and want
to maximize the expected value choosing whether accept or refuse current alterna-
tive, with a ﬁnite number of alternatives (we assume now no cost for gathering new
observations). The diﬀerence we introduce here is that we do not know a priori the
distribution of the values.
We assume the only information available at the beginning of a sequence is that all
the values are extracted from a common normal distribution, but the two parameters
that describe the distribution (mean and variance) are not known. We also assume
12First and second change are strongly connected and represent the implementation of a unique
change that eﬀects both assumptions 4 and 5.
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the decision maker knows the values are independently and identically distributed.
Similarly to traditional problem solved by cutoﬀ rule we can clearly recognize the
trade-oﬀ between early and late stopping. In particular in this case the information
about the distribution are updated because at each step the decision maker gets
a new variable randomly drawn from the unknown distribution.
This means that, in correspondence to each step, the beliefs about the distribution
change (i.e. the estimates of the values of mean and variance are updated) and are
more reliable (it is possible to attribute an increasing degree of conﬁdence).
To sum up, the assumptions13 of this normal-distribution variation on the secre-
tary problem are:
1. The number of applicants for employment, n, is ﬁnite and known;
2. A single position is available;
3. The n applicants are interviewed (evaluated) sequentially in random order with
each of the n! orderings equally likely;
4*. The values of the applicants are randomly generated by a normal distribution;
5*. The decision maker knows the cardinal value of the applicants and knows they
are generated by a normal distribution, but she does not know the parameters (mean
and variance) of the distribution;
6. Once rejected, an applicant cannot be recalled;
7*. The decision maker's goal is to maximize expected payoﬀ: her gain is equal to
the cardinal value of the selected applicant.
As in the traditional problem we include no explicit cost in moving from an element
to the following one of the sequence.
In this new framework we do not consider a 0-1 utility function. The three main
heuristics in the literature are focused on selecting the best applicant, so a priori we
do not know their performance in this new problem.
In the traditional problem picking the second best was as bad as choosing the worst
applicant. In our case this is not true. We can modify cutoﬀ rule, candidate count
13Asterisks indicate the assumption we changed from the traditional problem.
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rule and successive non-candidate rule in order to allow second-best choices.
In general we can characterize any of the three heuristics by two parameters:
- the parameter p that indicates how many observations wait before starting
the selection process. This corresponds to the single parameters adopted in
traditional formulation of the heuristics (r, c or k);
- a new parameter k that deﬁnes the relative rank of the highest value to com-
pare to current option. If we consider k = 1 the rules coincide with original
deﬁnitions. With k = 2 current option is compared with the second best al-
ternative met so far.
We could say otherwise that k changes the deﬁnition of candidates: a candi-
date is an applicant with a value higher than the k-th best one met until that
point of the sequence.
Figure 3 shows how performance of each heuristic vary according to the combination
(p, k) of parameters. Performance is now deﬁned as average win instead of proba-
bility of success.
To allow comparison we obtained results by repeated simulation (100.000 simula-
tions for the results shown in the ﬁgure) using standardized normal distributions,
i.e. normal distribution with µ = 0 and σ = 1, and sequences with n = 20.
Figure 3: Performance of the models under diﬀerent parameters
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Looking at the curves we can see that the rules have similar performances with
k = 1 and k = 2 using diﬀerent parameters of p. If we increase the ranking of the
benchmark candidate we can notice the optimal value of p is higher as well. For
example the cutoﬀ rule with n = 20 shows the best performances with the combi-
nations k = 1, p = 5 (score 1.18), k = 2, p = 11 (score 1.19) and k = 3, p = 13 (score
1.17).
Similar results for candidate count rule (k = 1, p = 3; k = 2, p = 5; k = 3, p = 7).
Successive non-candidate rule displays a diﬀerent structure. The shape of the curves
are similar, with the score for k = 2 slightly below the original rule, and with evi-
dently worse performance in correspondence to other levels. The optimal value of p
is not diﬀerent in these cases (p = 3).
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7 Dynamic threshold models of optimal stopping
7.1 Solving the problem: the dynamic threshold model
In a full information problem like the one discussed in Muller (2000) options are
random variables drawn i.i.d. from a distribution assumed to be known to the de-
cision maker before the search starts.
In partial information problems this assumption is relaxed. In our case we assume
the decision maker knows that the distribution is normal, but she must learn its
mean and variance during the search process.
Finally, in a no-information problem the distribution is unknown and cannot be
learned during the search process, as in the traditional formulation of the secretary
problem. In that case the unique information is the relative ordinal value of each
alternative.
To solve our variation on the problem we have to ﬁnd the region of acceptance
for each combination of values observed and number of items left. We solve ﬁrst
the problem in the case of known parameters of the normal distribution, then we
introduce uncertainty about one or both the parameters and solve the problem with
uncertainty.
In all the cases we use a threshold model, similar to those described in Rapoport
and Tversky (1970), Bearden, Murphy and Rapoport (2005) and Costa and Averbeck
(2015). For each stage we accept an applicant if its value exceeds the corresponding
threshold, and refuse it otherwise. In case of partial knowledge every new applicant
is used as an information to improve the estimate of the parameters.
In the case of perfect information we use the classic framework of initial expected
value maximization problem. As in Muller's paper the stopping rule is deﬁned by
the stopping regions, i.e. the regions of values such that accepting is a better option
than refusing.
Let s be current available oﬀer, and k the number of possible observations left before
the end of the sequence.
The problem consists in the maximization of the expected value of the reward ob-
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tained at each stage according to the optimal policy. By recursive method we want
to maximize the expected value of the reward at the beginning at the sequence.
We deﬁne Jk(s) the optimal expected reward if there are still k possible observations
and s is the available oﬀer.
By deﬁnition J0(s) = s, i.e. when the decision maker is facing the last element
(so there are 0 observations left) she can do nothing but accept current option.
If there are one or more observations left, the decision maker should take the action
(accept or refuse current option) that maximized the expected value. According to
this Jk(s) = Max{s, EJk−1(X)} where X represents the random variable.
The reservation level, corresponding to the threshold value, is equal to the expected
value of the gain at the following step.
r∗k ≡ EJk−1(X).
Hence it is optimal to accept option s if s ≥ r∗k.
The reservation level at the last-but-one step is equal to the expected value of the
random variable. If the decision maker declines current option, she will reach the
last observation and is forced to accept it. In case the distribution is known
r∗1 ≡ EX = µ
If the mean is unknown, the decision maker can estimate its value using previous
observations since we are facing a partial information problem. In this case the
reservation level is modiﬁed into
r∗1 ≡ EX = µˆ.
For k > 1 the expected value at the following step can be calculated by the distri-
bution of X.
E(Xk) = pr(X ≤ E(Xk−1)) · E(Xk−1) + pr(X > E(Xk−1)) · E(X|X > E(Xk−1))
Given the distribution of the random variable, we consider separately the two sides
divided by the reservation level at the following step. The part on the left repre-
sents the values that would not be accepted. For those values the decision maker
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will refuse the oﬀer and go to the next option, and her expected value is equal to the
corresponding step, so it is given regardless the current option s. On the other side,
the values on the right would be accepted as they are above the threshold value.
In this case the distribution of X determines both the probability and the expected
value of the right tail.
We deﬁne E(Xk) the expected value of the gain when there are k observations
left using a certain rule. We also deﬁne E(X1) ≡ E(X).
We can now write the problem
MaxE(Xn) with X ∼ N(0, 1).
The reservation level at each stage is evaluated iterating the computation
Jk(s) = Max{s, EJk−1(X)}
After each observation the decision maker decided whether to accept or refuse cur-
rent observation according to the threshold
Jk(s) =
 s (accept) if s ≥ r∗k ≡ EJk−1(X)r∗k (refuse) if s < r∗k
EJk(X) = Max{X,EJk−1(X)} =
 X if X ≥ EJk−1(X)EJk−1(X) if X < EJk−1(X)
We can solve recursively. In case of perfect knowledge and standardized normal
distribution r∗1 = EJ0(X) = 0, r
∗
2 = 0.4637, r
3 = 0.6752 and so on.
Given a sequence made up of 20 elements we get a series of reservation levels in
correspondence of each stage r∗19 , ... , r
∗
1 and the expected gain at the beginning of
the trial r∗20 = EJ19(X) = 1.43.
In case of imperfect knowledge about the distribution the decision maker knows
that the distribution used to generate observation is a normal distribution. Accord-
ing to the assumptions, she may know only the mean or the variance, or none of
them.
We maintain the maximization problem and the solution by recursive method, but
the expected values are unknown at the beginning of the sequence as it is not pos-
sible to deﬁne the original distribution.
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Observations are used to infer these values. In correspondence to each informa-
tion set we can estimate the originating distribution's parameter (or parameters).
The more values we know, the higher our conﬁdence for the estimated parameters
is. Because of this, the stopping thresholds are updated after every new observation.
Acceptance choice also depends from the number of trials left. The closer we are to
the end of the sequence, the lowest the threshold value is.
The optimal policy requires a dynamic threshold model that operates at each round
with the following three steps:
1. Update the estimate of the parameters µˆ and σˆ2 of the distribution using the
new observation;
2. Create a series of thresholds for k = 1, 2, ... depending on number of observed
values i and estimated values of mean and variance µˆ and σˆ2: Jk(µˆ, σˆ);
3. Accept the current alternative s only if it is above the threshold corresponding
to current number k of remaining observations.
If both the parameters are known, this model collapses to the previously described
one.
If only mean is unknown, the estimation of the variance is substituted with the true
value and vice versa.
In the optimal policy the estimate of the mean is calculated as average of the ob-
served values, whereas the variance is calculated as unbiased sample variance:
µˆ =
i∑
1
si , σˆ
2 =
∑i
1(si − µˆ)2
i− 1 (i > 1)
Jk(µˆ, σˆ) = Max{X,EJk−1(µˆ, σˆ)}
Unlike the threshold model with perfect knowledge, adopting the dynamic threshold
model it is not possible to calculate the expected reward at the beginning of the
sequence.
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7.2 New heuristics for the problem
Candidate count and successive non-candidate are the main heuristics that Seale
and Rapoport (1997) studied to ﬁt behavioural data. They can be easily compared
to the cutoﬀ rule and in particular to the optimal policy for the traditional problem
on dimensions including performance, average position and percentage of no choice.
Heuristics can be useful to explain suboptimal behaviour. Gigerenzer and Todd
(1999) describes the role of homo oeuristicus and stresses the importance of simpli-
ﬁed rules for learning and performing well, sometimes even better than in the case
of optimal policy. In case of uncertainty or ambiguity heuristics can be more ﬂexible
and reliable than a ﬁxed rule.
Hommes (2013) describes non-optimizing heuristics in the theory of ﬁnancial mar-
kets. Simple rules can be computationally less demanding than structured models,
so they are easier and faster to adopt. According to Hommes observation, ﬁnancial
markets are characterized by high volatility, and time plays an important role in
decision making. Furthermore, results depend from a large number of interacting
actors, hence it is not possible to ﬁnd a univocal solution for the problem.
Finally, in case of maximizing or minimizing problems there is a unique solution or
a set of solutions. Heuristics allow a much higher degree of heterogeneity. In our
case heterogeneity can be related to the type of rule the decision maker adopts or
the parameters she considers for the choice.14
For our problem we have already described a generalization on previously stud-
ied heuristics. We introduced the possibility to choose non-best candidates and
compared the robustness of the performance.
We introduce now two new rules speciﬁcally designed for this task15 called cutoﬀ-
threshold rule and maximum-threshold rule.
14For an example of heterogeneous heuristics adopted in an optimal stopping task, see Seale
and Rapoport (1997). They check which of the combinations rule-parameter can ﬁt the best
behavioural results for a group of 32 participants to an optimal stopping task.
15During the pilot and the experiment the participants were asked to explain the rules they
adopted to take decisions. Answers from the pilot gave us some insights about possible simpliﬁca-
tions subjects used.
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As the name suggests, the cutoﬀ-threshold rule includes features both from cut-
oﬀ rule and threshold model. As in the cutoﬀ rule, the decision maker initially
observes a certain number of values as exploration. These observations do not lead
to any choice and allow a ﬁrst estimate of the unknown parameters.
After the cutoﬀ position, thresholds are calculated using estimates for mean and
variance. In particular we consider a cutoﬀ position i = 5 and generate thresholds
linearly with respect to the number of observations left.
To express the linear relation we multiply the number of observations left16 by a
ﬁxed parameter (in this case l = 0.1). In correspondence to observation i = 6, i.e.
with 14 remaining choices, the threshold value is calculated as
J c(k = 14, l = 0.1) = µˆ+ 1.3 · σˆ
In general the threshold value for the cutoﬀ threshold rule is
J c(k, l) = µˆ+ l · (k − 1) · σˆ , i > 5
The maximum-threshold rule is a less demanding heuristic as it does not require to
estimate the variance. It adopts the maximum value observed during the sequence
as a benchmark for the following observations.
Also in this rule the ﬁrst observations are used as an exploratory part of the task;
after that diﬀerent thresholds are computed.
After the cutoﬀ position the decision maker considers sample average and maxi-
mum value observed. The reservation level is the sum of the estimate of the mean
and the diﬀerence between maximum and mean, multiplied by a decreasing coeﬃ-
cient (a ﬁxed parameter l = 0.1 that multiplies the number k−1 of observations left).
In our case we consider again i = 5 as cutoﬀ position for the exploratory task
and deﬁne M(i) = Max(s1, s2, ..., si) the highest observed value. Threshold are cal-
culated linearly with respect to the number of observations left. in correspondence
to observation i = 6 we calculate the threshold as
Jm(i = 6, k = 14, l = 0.1) = µˆ+ 1.3 · (M(i)− µˆ)
16We consider k−1 instead of k to preserve the property of reservation level equal to the estimate
of the mean in correspondence to the last but one observation.
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In general the threshold value for the maximum threshold rule is
Jm(i, k, l) = µˆ+ l · (k − 1) · (M(i)− µˆ) , i > 5
Both of these heuristics share three essential features with the optimal policy de-
scribed by the dynamic threshold model.
First, they update the threshold values after each new observation considering both
the number of steps left and the conﬁdence in the estimates on the parameters.
Second, they explicitly take into account the mean, and at the last-but-one step
they accept any value above average. This characteristic is based on a risk-neutral
assumption and excludes any eﬀect due to the absolute cardinal value of the obser-
vations.
Finally, the values of the thresholds are decreasing with respect to the number of
choices left. This is calculated diﬀerently from the dynamic threshold model as the
relation in the heuristics is linear.17
We want to compare the performance of the dynamic threshold model with previous
and new heuristics considering full or partial information about the distribution.
Old heuristics do not use extra information if available, and because of this their
performances do not change, and maximum threshold does not include the correct
value of the variance if available.
Table 2 shows the results. The table contains the average performance for traditional
and second-best cutoﬀ model, candidate count, successive non-candidate, dynamic
threshold, cutoﬀ-threshold and maximum threshold.18 Performance is considered as
average gain with standardized normal distributions. Results are calculated using
100,000 simulations.
A detailed description of the choice criteria according to each rule can be also found
in Appendix B - Pseudo-codes.
17The design of cutoﬀ threshold and maximum threshold rules include some of the features
explicitly described by participants in their comments to the choice task.
18Best performing parameters were adopted for the heuristics. Cutoﬀ uses k = 1, p = 5, cutoﬀ
2 includes the second best k = 2, p = 10. Cutoﬀ threshold and maximum threshold use the
parameters described above: cutoﬀ in position i = 5 and l = 0.1
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Model
µ known
σ known
µ known
σ unknown
µ unknown
σ known
µ unknown
σ unknown
Cutoﬀ 1.1732 1.1732 1.1732 1.1732
Cutoﬀ 2 1.1864 1.1864 1.1864 1.1864
Candidate 1.0459 1.0459 1.0459 1.0459
Non-candidate 1.0948 1.0948 1.0948 1.0948
Dynamic threshold 1.3465 1.3238 1.3124 1.2864
Cutoﬀ threshold 1.2951 1.2737 1.2662 1.2434
Maximum threshold 1.2326 1.2326 1.2184 1.2184
Table 2: Performance of diﬀerent models under full, partial or no initial information.
As we can see the expected performance of the family of threshold rules is higher
than all the previous heuristics, because they consider the distribution of values and
can update information with new observations, learning during the sequence.
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8 Modelling heterogeneity
As a ﬁrst step in the description of the problem we solved the case of perfect knowl-
edge about the parameters of the distribution and we found the reservation levels
Jk(s) = Max{s, EJk−1(x)}
After that we introduced uncertainty about one or both the parameters
Jk(s, µˆ, σˆ) = Max{s, EJk−1(x, µˆ, σˆ)}
We want now to test the best response model with imperfect knowledge and intro-
duce heterogeneity in the way of computing the threshold values. We consider two
main elements that can change between agents and drive diﬀerent choices.
The ﬁrst one is the ability of estimating the parameters. We can deﬁne this ability
as the result of interaction between intelligence and memory skills, that determine
the accuracy in the creation of beliefs about the distribution.
Risk attitude is the second element we introduce.
Both these elements can have an impact in the evaluation of the reservation level.
In particular we can assume an higher level of risk aversion decreases the threshold
value, whereas the ability to estimate parameters can separate the value from the
optimal one in both the directions.
We assume both these traits have little impact when the decision maker is close
to the end of the sequence, whereas their importance gets bigger as the number of
observation left increases.19
We deﬁne the impact of these factors using a coeﬃcient m(k, α, β) that represents
the gap between optimal and personal reservation level. The coeﬃcient depends on
19We can intuitively explain the reason for this assumption for both the elements. Low ability
in the estimate of the parameters plays a minor role when a big number of observations have
been collected, but can be crucial after a few values because of the lack of a priori beliefs about
the distribution and the diﬃculty of discriminating outliers from average values. Similarly, risk
aversion cannot have a major role when only a few observations are left, while the decision maker
facing a relatively high value after a few observations will be tempted to accept it and stop the
sequence.
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k (number of observations left), a parameter α that describes the risk attitude20 and
β that captures the accuracy in the estimate of the parameters using the information
available.21
We do not distinguish the impact of the two components on the coeﬃcient m and
use a unique parameter g to deﬁne the gap. In this way we obtain a coeﬃcient
m(k, g) that only depends on the number of observations left and on the value of
the gap.22
m(k, α, β) = m(k, g) = m(1, g)k = (1 + g)k
As we already explained this approach is able to diminish the impact of intelli-
gence, memory and risk aversion when the number of observations left declines.
The threshold in correspondence to each stage are computed by iteration as usual
Jk(s, µˆ, σˆ, g) = Max{s, EJk−1(x, µˆ, σˆ) ·m(k, g)}
This approach is useful to test the robustness of the performance of the threshold
model in case of small deviations from the optimal policy.23
Again we multiply the threshold value in correspondence of each stage by the coef-
ﬁcient m(k, g) close to 1.
We consider the interval g ∈ [−0.01, 0.01] with 0.001 precision and compare the per-
formance of the dynamic threshold model using the diﬀerent values of the thresholds
in 100.000 sequences.
The graph shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerence comparing the performance of the basic
model and the values close to one assigned to the coeﬃcient. This result can be
explained by the limited number of times where this slight change in the threshold
causes a diﬀerent choice.
20The value of α represents the risk attitude. It can assume positive values (risk seeking) or
negative values (risk aversion). In case of risk neutrality, as we have for the optimal policy, α = 0.
21The parameter β describes the accuracy in the estimate. It is deﬁned as the gap from the
correct threshold value (so it actually describes the imprecision) and assumes positive values. In
case of perfect accuracy, as we have in the optimal policy, its value is β = 0.
22This approach can be used to implement a probabilistic threshold model with fuzzy reservation
levels. Given the optimal value of the threshold according to a model and a gap, it is possible to
deﬁne three regions: one of acceptance and one of reject, and an intermediate region where the
probability of acceptance increases as the value is closer to the actual threshold value.
23The detailed procedure adopted to test the robustness is described in Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Dynamic threshold model with diﬀerent values of g
If we consider values in a broader interval we can recognize a signiﬁcant decrease in
the score obtained, and plotting the performance as a function of the value ofm(1, g)
we can clearly recognize a smooth curve with the maximum in correspondence of
m(1, g = 0) = 1.
Figure 5: Robustness of cutoﬀ threshold and maximum threshold models
Cutoﬀ threshold and maximum threshold rules show similar results, but the best
performance does not correspond to the case without deviance. In correspondence
to the cutoﬀ threshold rule we ﬁnd the best results with m(1, g) = 1.004.
This rule is naturally more risk averse than the dynamic threshold model and a
slightly higher value of the coeﬃcient partially corrects this aspect.
It is possible to introduce and discuss other elements of heterogeneity. The ﬁrst
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one we implicitly introduced is in the diﬀerent rules that can be adopted to face the
problem. Old rules and heuristics in the class of threshold models are some exam-
ples. It is possible to design a plurality of heuristics that share some of the features
of the previous ones. Within each model it is possible to change the parameters,
like the benchmark position and the position of the cutoﬀ observation in the cutoﬀ
rule.
A second aspect of heterogeneity is the one we described above with reference to
risk attitude. We included a characteristic of the agent that is constant through all
the task, facing diﬀerent trials of the same problem.
Risk aversion becomes endogenous if we shift the value of gap g after every trial
according to previous gains. For example we can increase risk aversion after the
selection of a low value and vice versa. This change can be temporary (only due to
previous choice) or cumulative (the decision maker considers all previous gains).
A similar aspect can be found with a discrimination between diﬀerent cardinal val-
ues. Some decision maker can act diﬀerently when she faces high or low (absolute)
values. It is easy to include this feature, and in particular recognize if diﬀerent rules
or parameters are adopted in correspondence to sequences with high mean (when
decision makers tend to be more conservative). The waiting time before choice is
the main element that can discriminate this behaviour.
Finally we can deﬁne heterogeneity in the distribution of not-systemic biases. The
decision maker can learn from previous trials and improve her performance by updat-
ing the rule adopted or the computational ability (estimate the parameters, improve
the precision). This aspect is strongly connected to the type of feedback she receives
and the goal of the task.
54
9 Experimental results
9.1 Subjects, data collected and experimental design
In order to validate the results of the previous sections we decided to test which of
the models ﬁts behavioural data the best. We conducted an experiment made by
two parts. In the ﬁrst one subjects performed an optimal stopping task under the
assumptions deﬁned by the normal-distribution variation of the secretary problem.
In the second part we collected data about possible drivers of the performance: in-
telligence, working memory and risk aversion.
Two sessions of the experiments were conducted at University of Trento (Depart-
ment of Psychology) and University of Pisa (Department of Economics). In all the
sessions subjects were undergraduate and graduate students at their respective uni-
versities (average age 21 years).24
120 subjects (40 males and 80 females) participated in the experiment. They were
recruited by advertisements asking for volunteers to take part to a paid computer-
controlled experiment concerning decisions under uncertainty with payoﬀ contin-
gent on performance. The experiment, including explanations and questionnaires,
required one hour and a half and subjects were paid between 10 and 20 euros ac-
cording to their performance during the main task.
Subjects arrived at the laboratory in small groups (usually two to ﬁve) and were
seated in a room equipped with PCs. The experimenter explained the secretary
problem task with particular emphasis on how the distribution change as new se-
quences is observed.25 After the instructions subjects performed a sample exercise
24As a preliminary step we run a pilot experiment with 10 students (5 males and 5 females) at
University of Pisa. Participants completed the questionnaires and a version of the optimal stopping
task shorter than the ﬁnal one (15 sequences instead of 30). Pilot results has been used to deﬁne
details of the main task in order to focus on the main conjectures. Additionally we collected
feedback about the single questionnaires and in particular about rules adopted during the optimal
stopping task.
25The detailed description of the instructions can be found in Appendix A.1.
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to have a chance to become familiar with the procedure. Participants did not receive
any written copy of the instructions and were invited to ask questions either during
the description of the task or after the sample exercise.
Each subject completed 30 independent trials after the sample one. Each trial
consisted of a number of values equal to 20. The absolute value of current applicant
was displayed on the screen after a short message that indicated the number of val-
ues already observed. As we consider crucial for diﬀerent rules to know the number
of observations left, we make this information available at each step, as a diﬀerence
between the total number of applicants and the current number of refused oﬀers.
In correspondence to each observation only current absolute value was displayed.
Previous observations were not available on the screen and subjects did not have
the possibility to write them down.
Values lasted on the screen for 2.5 seconds. In order to skip the options subjects
had to wait, as numbers automatically ﬂowed on the screen. To select current value
it was suﬃcient to press the space bar on the keyboard. The selection process did
not allow any recall option and the sequence was stopped immediately after choice.
Subjects could not verify the goodness of their choices as remaining options were
not shown.
Subject were informed that they would be facing values from normal distributions
with unknown parameters of mean and variance. During the instructions a brief ex-
planation of main characteristics of a normal distribution was given to participants.
The sequences were divided into three groups according to the value of the mean of
the generating distribution. Participants knew distributions had diﬀerent values but
were not informed about the group of the sequence of the current trial. At the end
of the experiment subjects drew three numbers corresponding to three sequences,
one for each group (sequences with low, average and high mean). Final payment
was equal to the average of the values selected by the participant in the extracted
sequences, plus 3 euros as show-up fee. Because of the values of each group of se-
quences subjects received as a payment sums between 10 and 20 euros.
To maintain comparability and interpret experimental results, all the participants
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viewed the same 30 sequences in diﬀerent orders. The 20 elements of each sequence
always maintain the positions.
We generated the sequences randomly from diﬀerent normal distributions with var-
ious means and variances and checked the randomization splitting the 30 sequences
into three block. The order subjects faced sequences is random within each block,
but blocks are introduced in the same order. In this way we can compare the per-
formance of each block and compare choices and learning eﬀect.
Each block contains sequences with the position of choice according to cutoﬀ rule
antecedent, equal or subsequent the threshold model. Furthermore, a second check
is on the position of the best option (randomly assigned). Finally each block in-
cludes sequences with diﬀerent parameters. Values of mean are contained in the
interval 4-16, standard deviation in the interval 1-3.26
In correspondence of each trial we save position and absolute value selected by
the participant, responding time, sequence and block. We also have information
about possible correspondence between participant's choice and models and a be-
tween chosen value and best element of the sequence.
Using all these information it is possible to recognize pattern of behaviour according
to one or more of the models we described.
To better understand behavioural results we include in the experiment some ques-
tionnaires. In this way we want to capture the role of intelligence, working memory
and risk aversion. These elements could be drivers of the performance, as they are
simpler elements of the optimal stopping task.
In order to measure intelligence we adopt RAPM (Raven Advance Progressive Ma-
trices), a test that captures the ability to recognize patterns, and CRT (Cognitive
Reﬂection test), a series of questions that indicate the tradeoﬀ between a rapid,
intuitive answer and a more pondered result.
Holt & Laury test is adopted to measure risk aversion, whereas free recall Working
Memory Test and Wechsler Digit Span test are used to collect working memory
26Further details about generation and randomization of sequence can be found in Appendix
B.9.
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parameters. The optimal stopping task is complex and contains elements from all
these three categories. Intelligence and pattern recognition are necessary to estimate
unknown parameters and evaluate current options, working memory plays a big role
in the adoption of previous information, ﬁnally risk aversion can eﬀect choice causing
early stopping.27
9.2 Research questions and conjectures
Lee (2006) argues optimal stopping problems naturally distinguish between per-
formance based on achieving optimal outcomes, i.e. choosing the ﬁnal value, and
performance based on following optimal decision processes, i.e. choosing the correct
value. Simon (1976) termed these diﬀerent measures procedural and substantive
rationality, respectively, and noted that procedural measures are less noisy.
We enquire both the aspects analyzing the performance measured by average gain
and the adherence to one of the models we deﬁned in the previous sections.
Unless the subject is directly asked about the decision rule she used, there is no ob-
vious and nonambiguous way to infer the rule from her responses on any particular
trial. Even if we assume that the subject adheres to one rule, there is no way to
determine the exact value of the model's single parameter from her response. We
focus on the decision rules introduced earlier and proceeded to test them.
We focus on four main aspects using available data.
First, we can test which of the rules we described (old and new ones) ﬁts the best
behavioural data. As the problem we use is diﬀerent from the traditional secretary
problem we want to study the eﬀects of the changes on the search behaviour.
Second, we compare behaviour and common biases in this variation with the evi-
dences from the traditional version of the problem.
Third, we use data collected with other tests measuring intelligence, working mem-
ory and risk attitude to study the drivers of the performance, if any.
Finally we enquire the role of learning though the task. If there is an improvement
in the performance, we consider if it is generated by a reduction in the early stopping
bias or by better estimates of the unknown parameters.
27Appendix B contains instructions for all the questionnaires.
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Our main research questions and conjectures cover this four areas.
Our research focuses on two aspects neglected by previous experiments: the role of
intelligence and the class of model adopted in case absolute values of the applicants
are shown to the decision maker.
Can we identify drivers of performance? Which components of intelligence have an
impact on the choice in the optimal stopping task? Intelligence and working mem-
ory are candidates as drivers of performance.
Does risk attitude have an impact on the ability of selecting best alternatives and
on the model adopted? We want to test if risk averse subject suﬀer early stopping
or risk seeking subjects choose optimally or suﬀer late stopping.
One of our hypothesis is that risk aversion does not change during the experiment,
whereas the ability of estimating the parameters improves through the experiment
for all the subjects. We want to verify if high-intelligence subjects converge faster
to the unbiased estimates, corresponding to higher gains.
We want to verify if learning occurs, comparing diﬀerent blocks. If yes, it can
be measured as average gain or precision in the adoption of one of the models.
About the role of intelligence, if any, we want to discriminate if its eﬀect is impor-
tant for all the performance (since the ﬁrst sequence) or impacts learning during the
experiment?28
Finally, with respect to old heuristics, we want to compare traditional cutoﬀ rule
with its second-best variation. In this way we want to deﬁne which of the possible
deﬁnitions ﬁts behavioural data the best.
9.3 Results
Behavioural data can be studied using diﬀerent perspectives.
Table 3 contains correlation values and oﬀers a complete description of the relation-
ships between questionnaires and performance in the optimal stopping task.
In particular we are interested in two diﬀerent classes of parameters that describe
28This question corresponds to the distinction between faster learning by thinking or learning by
doing driven by trials and errors.
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performance. On one side we consider average position chosen, indicating the wait-
ing time, average gained value and number of choices corresponding to best options.
Additionally we consider the adherence with diﬀerent behavioural models.
Results show a strong positive correlation between RAPM - CRT scores and the
adoption of models. Working memory tests show little correlation, and HL scores
(corresponding to risk aversion) are weakly negatively correlated to the performance.
Intelligence appears as the strongest predictor of performance. Performing regres-
sion of the performance expressed in various terms we can see that intelligence tests
(Raven test and Cognitive reﬂection test) are the only variables with a signiﬁcant
positive coeﬃcient (1% signiﬁcance).
Figure 6: Distribution of performance with respect to Raven score
Figure 6 shows the performance (win) and average position selected.
In order to study the impact of intelligence we consider two separate clusters corre-
sponding to quintiles according to the performance in the Raven Advanced Matrices
Test.
Table 4 shows strong diﬀerences in all the variables. Intelligence measured by the
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two tests is strongly correlated (RAPM and CRT), but higher clusters are associ-
ated with higher score in the working memory tests , average position and value. In
particular we recognize little diﬀerence between clusters 2 and 3, whereas groups 1
and 4 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
Adoption of behavioural models is strongly correlated with the RAPM score, as the
number of choices coherent with behavioural models always increases in the high-
est clusters, and this eﬀect is particularly higher if we consider the cutoﬀ-threshold
model.
Figure 7: Number of choices according to diﬀerent models
Figure 7 displays the distribution of the models adopted. Cutoﬀ-threshold models
is widely adopted, in particular for high RAPM scores (bandwidth 20-30 correct
answers).
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Figure 8: Learning - adoption of behavioural models during the experiment
The distribution of models adopted is also connected with the learning phenomena.
Comparing average number of choices according to main models we recognize a gen-
eral increase between block 1 (sequences 1-10) and block 2 (sequences 11-20). This
eﬀect is parallel to performance of the diﬀerent clusters and can be studied also
under diﬀerent criteria to build clusters.
Figure 9: Learning - number of best choices according to diﬀerent clusters
Division of the subjects according to RAPM, CRT, HL and WMT score always dis-
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play learning eﬀect in the number of choices corresponding to the best value within
the sequence (ﬁgure 9).
Figure 10: Diﬀerent behaviour under sequences with low and high mean values
Finally we consider the diﬀerence between sequences with higher or lower values
of the mean. Results shows participants generally behave diﬀerently, with worse
performance under high sequences. This result is led by a dramatic reduction in the
number of observations before choice.
Figure 10 shows the relation between this phenomenon and the role of intelligence.
Average position is not diﬀerent under low and medium sequences, but it is signiﬁ-
cantly lower if we consider high sequences. What is more interesting is how diﬀerent
clusters behave: the ﬁrst cluster (low score) shows a reduction of over 3 positions, the
fourth cluster (high score) only 1.5. Similar evidences appear from the analysis of
the number of choices according to main models, and in particular cutoﬀ-threshold
model.
Participants of all the clusters perform better under medium sequences, with a sig-
niﬁcant decline under high values.
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10 Areas of application
Optimal stopping problems have a wide range of applications.29 Our variation on
the traditional secretary problem introduces two aspects that make the choice sit-
uation more plausible. First, a choice close to the best one generates only a small
reduction in the gain. Second, we can introduce learning eﬀect in the precision of
estimate of the unknown parameters of the distribution within each trial.
The normal distribution assumption is necessary to allow comparison with the op-
timal policy. Introducing heterogeneity about the distribution is a possible im-
plementation of the problem.30 Kahan et al. (1967) tested the eﬀect of diﬀerent
distributions within the traditional framework and found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in the choice pattern used by subjects. We already tested the performance of vari-
ations on old heuristics. Results are comparable with the normal distribution case
with slightly diﬀerent optimal values for the position parameter according to the
skewedness of the distribution.
As general examples of areas of applications we propose here three main areas:
ﬁnance, staﬀ selection and consumption.
About ﬁnance we do not think this model and scenario can be applied to profes-
sional broker choices. The number of observations available, the specialization in the
recognition of trends and the role of sophisticated computational tools cover most
of the elements of uncertainty of the decision maker. Furthermore, if we consider
ﬁnancial markets we know that ﬁnal results come from the interaction between in-
vestors and expectations play a major role.
If we think about naïve investors the scenario could be more credible. Households
looking for a loan have time constraints, uncertainty about economic dynamics (as
interest rates can suddenly change) and perform a costly learning activity comparing
29More examples of applications in statistics and operational research can be found in Rothschild
(1974) and Monahan (1982).
30We can design a task with no prior knowledge about the shape of the distribution. In this case
we can consider normal, beta, power law, uniform and other distributions. The role of memory
and intelligence in this case would not be related to the ability of estimating the unknown param-
eters. The most important aspect in this case is in fact the ability to recognize the shape of the
distribution, and in particular the dispersion of values in the right tail of the distribution.
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more alternatives. If they refuse an oﬀer they could have no perfect recall option,
as the opportunity passed or its features changed.
Similarly, small ﬁrms comparing alternative projects to implement or asking credit
to diﬀerent banks display most of the characteristics of the scenario we described.
The ﬁctitious choice situation described by the secretary problem refers to staﬀ
selection. Is it possible to apply this framework in a real hiring problem? It is
interesting to test whether human resources do apply some model for their selection
processes, and at the moment the literature does not oﬀer any study focused on this
aspect.
Small and big ﬁrms face diﬀerent aspects of the problem. In particular we think
for small companies getting more information represents a bigger cost if there is no
speciﬁc division with best practices and continuous activity, whereas big companies
can face major issues related to time constraints.
To study the process we can also implement our model with new features, in par-
ticular using larger time windows and partial recall option.31
The literature about optimal stopping and the secretary problem presents many
examples of consumption decision: buy plane tickets, visit stores, look for partner,
etc.
We think it is possible to apply this model to decisions involving uncertainty about
product quality. The insights about the role of intelligence have clear marketing
implications. Absent-minded consumers can be easily distracted by high discounts,
choose the ﬁrst product on the shelf at the supermarket and buy the ﬁrst plane
ticket they ﬁnd.
Can this exploration vs exploitation framework get the major intuitions about the
role of intelligence? According to the eﬀects of learning, repeating the task with
diﬀerent values we could even propose a mild policy implication based on the imple-
mentation of diﬀerent ﬁctitious choice situations in order to improve the conﬁdence
for real decision and reduce potentially harmful distortive eﬀects.
31If applicants look for other job opportunities, human resources have decreasing probability of
successful recall if they submit late oﬀers. Smith (1975) ﬁrst considered this feature in an optimal
stopping problem.
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11 Conclusions
Researchers adopted the secretary framework to represent decision problems includ-
ing hiring, replace a machine, buy a ticket, mating and stock trading.
In all these situations typical economic assumptions are not satisﬁed. Limited knowl-
edge of alternatives or uncertainty about the eﬀects, time constraints and computa-
tional limits are some of the causes of failure in the design of a pure maximization
problem.
Exploration vs exploitation tradeoﬀ is another versatile element and can be ap-
plied in many situations, from the search of a ﬂat to rent to the research of a cloth
to buy during the discount period.
March (1991) described this dilemma between self-excluding exploration of new
possibilities (representing variation, search, experimentation, discovery, risk taking,
creativity) and exploitation of old certainties (corresponding to choice, production,
eﬀort, reﬁnement, eﬃciency, selection, implementation).
Variations on the secretary problem allow a wide range of applications. The de-
cision problem we propose is able to describe a simpliﬁed version of a large range
of common real-life situations that require role of learning through repeated obser-
vations and time constraints. We propose applications and suggest further research
in the areas of domestic ﬁnance and consumption.
The models we analyze represent diﬀerent degrees of complexity in the ability to
use previous information to create correct expectations.
Modiﬁcations on traditional heuristics allow diﬀerent levels of risk aversion. The
inclusion of non-optimal candidates in the range of acceptable alternatives does not
reduce the performance, and under some conditions the expected win increases.
Newly introduced threshold models (dynamic threshold, cutoﬀ-th. and max-th.) in-
clude learning mechanisms and increase their precision in the estimates considering
the observed applicants.
The dynamic threshold model represents the optimal policy but is very demanding
from a computational point of view. The other rules obtain good results and require
less eﬀort in the estimation of the correct values of the unknown parameters.
In the matter of exploration and exploitation the class of threshold rules combines
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them allowing coexistence. Each observation is adopted to reﬁne estimates and eval-
uated as an applicant.
As we discussed, time plays a crucial role and is tightly connected to learning. In
all the models we identiﬁed a basic and necessary level of exploration before decision.
We used behavioural data from an experiment with 120 participants to validate
the models and analyze which of them ﬁts human choices the best.
Versatile cutoﬀ-threshold model accounts for systematic pattern of behaviour ob-
served in human decision making to capture real choices. Participants often explic-
itly declared in the questionnaire that they waited a certain number of observations
before evaluating the alternatives. Subjects with early stopping choices had no
opportunity to learn from mistakes (no learning by doing, nor regret driving rein-
forcement learning).
Working memory and risk aversion display no impact on the performance or in the
model adopted by participants. Intelligence is the major driver of performance and
accuracy in the systematic adoption of models and ability to pick highest values.
This result is interesting because it captures the roles of intelligence and learning in
a task characterized by a crucial role of timing.
We did not include explicit costs for information neither in the theoretical prob-
lem nor in the experiment. Information are costly because of time (endogenous cost
of research) and other resources necessary to get them. In a more complex problem
this feature need to be taken into account.
Behavioural experiments showed how costs can aﬀect decision creating biases due
to explicit sunk costs. Little eﬀort was put in the design of simple tasks able to pair
learning and sunk costs and remove this bias.
The secretary problem contains other limits in terms of assumptions.
For example low and high absolute values are considered in the same way even in
the normal-distribution variation. Behavioural results show a signiﬁcant diﬀerent
comparing sequences with diﬀerent mean values. It is hence necessary to understand
if a unique model is able to describe both the cases or speciﬁc characteristics of each
background determine separate behavioural models.
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This aspect has real implications, since buying a ticket for a plane or signing a mort-
gage have diﬀerent absolute levels and temporal impacts.
Perfect memory and no recall option are strong assumptions as well. Both of them
can relaxed introducing partial or declining features.
Changes in choice preferences of the decision maker or the applicants represent an-
other possible issue. An agent whose oﬀer had been previously declined could retire
her proposal in a second moment, and this aspect is coherent with partial or no recall
option. It is quite obvious if we consider the secretary problem in the formulation
called ﬁancée problem. Koestler (1960) wrote that Johannes Kepler struggled with
this problem when interviewing applicants for his second wife. After interviewing
the ﬁfth, he decided to propose to the fourth one, who turned him down because he
had waited too long, or perhaps because he had other interviews.
Finally we want to stress the central role of threshold value. This concept cor-
responds to the acceptance regions deﬁned by Muller (2000) but can also be applied
in case of imperfect knowledge.
The concept of threshold is versatile and coherent with the satisﬁcing level de-
scribed by Simon (1955), and can easily modiﬁed to include elements of the prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Because of this, thresholds are a good tool in case we do not allow a proper maxi-
mization process and include uncertainty and learning.
One further implementation of this concept in presence of uncertainty allows the def-
inition of three distinct regions of a probabilistic threshold model: one of acceptance
and one of reject, and an intermediate region where the probability of acceptance
increases as the value is closer to the actual threshold value.
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Part III
Appendix
12 Appendix A - Subject instructions
12.1 Optimal stopping task
Imagine you are the director of a big company and you want to hire a secretary.
Twenty applicants are available for an interview.
You meet the ﬁrst candidate, interview her, and immediately after that you decide
whether to hire her.
If you hire a candidate you immediately stop the interviews. You have already de-
cided who you want to hire and do not need to meet the other applicants.
Otherwise, if you refuse current applicant, you do not have the opportunity to change
your mind and choose her in a second moment.
The task you are going to perform at the computer does not requires you to hire
a secretary, but the main rules are the same of the problem I have just described
you. You have to choose one value among a sequence of numbers, instead of hiring
a secretary among a group of applicants.
Every sequence is made by 20 numbers, expressed in euros, corresponding to you
possible gains. After the welcome frame, the numbers will sequentially appear on
the screen: value 1 out of 20 (for example 7,23 euros), value 2 out of 20 (e.g. 5,61
euros), and so on. Before every value you get the information about which position
of the sequence you are currently inspecting.
If you do nothing but wait, numbers automatically ﬂow on the screen. If you want
to select the current value on the screen, just press the space bar.
In this way the value is saved on the computer and the sequence is interrupted. You
go back to the initial frame and start a new sequence.
There are 30 sequences overall. At the end of the task you will draw three numbers
from a box. Each number correspond to a sequence. Your ﬁnal gain is equal to the
average of the values you selected in these sequences, plus a ﬂat amount of three
euros as a show-up fee. To win as much as you can you have to select every time
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the highest values of the sequences, but every sequence is diﬀerent from the others.
Do you know normal or Gauss distribution? [meanwhile we draw a distribution
as an example and explain the plot and the main properties]
The computer generated in this way the values you will see in the sequences. This
type of distribution is characterized by two parameters: mean and variance. The
mean [point the mean value in the graph] describes the average value you will ﬁnd
within the sequence. The variance represents how much values are spread around
the mean. In general values are concentrated around the mean. If you go further
and further from the mean the probability to ﬁnd a value much higher or lower
rapidly decades.
For example consider a normal distribution with a mean of 5 and a variance of 1.
About 70% of the values are concentrated between 4 and 6, 95% of the values are
concentrated between 3 and 7, and there is a small probability to ﬁnd some value
above 7 or below 3.
The values of mean and variance of the sequence are unknown, but you know that
they are stable during each sequence. All of the 20 elements are generated by the
same probability distribution, so mean and variance are the same.
After each choice you start a new sequence, corresponding to a new probability dis-
tribution. The values of the parameters here can be very diﬀerent from the values
of the previous one. For example you can ﬁnd an higher or lower value of the mean
(e.g. 12) and a greater or smaller variance (e.g. 3). In this case the values within
the sequence are much higher and spread more around the mean.
Is a value like 10 euros high or low? You do not know if you have no clue about the
parameters. In the ﬁrst example ten is an high value, in the second example it is
low.
In order to win as much as possible you have to choose high values in every sequence.
All the sequences are diﬀerent, and at the end you will draw three values. You will
get one value among the sequences with the lower values, one among the average
ones, and one among the highest, so it is crucial to do your best in all the cases.
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12.2 Raven test
In this test you will ﬁll every matrix with one of the eight possible tiles you ﬁnd.
In every matrix there are eight elements, the ninth one in the bottom right corner
is missing. Elements within each matrix are linked by some rules, and the rules are
diﬀerent for each matrix. If you analyze the available elements it is possible to ﬁnd
which tile is the only one that correctly ﬁlls all the rules.
The ﬁrst one is used as an example. The sequence of elements follows some regu-
larities.
If you study the rows you can see the bold shape are a square, a circle and a dia-
mond. All the elements are repeated in each row with a diﬀerent order.
If you consider the columns you can count the number of dotted lines. There are
one, two or three lines in each column.
Finally we can observe diagonals. In all the elements in the same diagonal there are
dotted lines with the same slope.
Element number 5 is the only one that ﬁlls all the rules we described.
Every matrix is designed with diﬀerent rules within its components. If you study
the available elements you are able to ﬁnd the correct missing element.
There are 29 matrices left. You have 20 minutes to solve as many matrices as you
can. Wrong answers are not penalized. You have to correctly answer the highest
number of cases.
12.3 Cognitive reﬂection test
Solve the three following problems.
1) A bat and a ball cost $ 1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost? ... cents
2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets? ... minutes
3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake? ... days
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12.4 Holt & Laury risk aversion test
In this test you will choose among your favourite one between a couples of lotteries.
The grid is made by ten couples of lotteries, one for each row. Let's look the ﬁrst
row. Imagine you won a ticket and you can decide whether use it to take part to
lottery A or lottery B.
Every lottery is deﬁned by two possible gains that can occur with given probabili-
ties. For example in this case lottery A will give you 4 euros with a probability of
1/10 or 3.20 euros with a probability of 9/10. Lottery B, instead, will give you 7.70
euros with probability 1/10 or 0.20 euros with probability 9/10.
Choose the lottery you prefer between lottery A and lottery B and write an X
on the corresponding cell, then move to the following couple. There are ten couples,
in each of them you have to pick one of the two options. The values of the possible
gains are the same in all the cases, probabilities will change for every case.
12.5 Working memory tests
Free recall working memory test
I will now read to you ten words. After I ﬁnish, you will write on the paper as many
words as you can remember. The order is not important, so write down the words
as they come to your mind.
Wechsler digit span test
I will now read to you some series of numbers. The series have increasing length.
Every time I complete a series, you will repeat after me the same numbers in the
same order I told you.
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13 Appendix B - Pseudo-codes
13.1 Data generation and preparatory calculation
Sequence generation: creation of sequences of 20 elements (randomly picked from a
standardized normal distribution, with mean 0 and variance 1).
Ordinal value: each element of the sequence is associated to its ordinal position
within the sequence (absolute) and within the portion of the sequence up to its
value (relative).
13.2 Cutoﬀ rule
Input: 20-elements sequence, benchmark position pos ∈ [1, 5], parameter par ∈
[1, 20]
Output: value chosen according to the model
- Observe ﬁrst par − 1 elements without choosing them
- From the element i = par on, choose the ﬁrst value greater or equal of the
highest value encountered so far (if pos = 1) or in general
- From the element i = par on, choose the ﬁrst value greater or equal of the
number pos highest value encountered so far
- If the last element of the sequence is reached without choosing, the 20th ele-
ment is automatically selected The script saves, for each of the 5 variants and
20 parameters, the choice (position in the sequence, absolute ordinal value and
value).
13.3 Candidate count rule
Input: 20-elements sequence, position pos ∈ [1, 5], parameter par ∈ [1, 20]
Output: value chosen according to the model
- Consider only the candidate elements of the sequence, e.g. the values higher
than the pos highest value encountered so far
- Count how many candidates are encountered, and choose the par candidate
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- If the last element of the sequence is reached without choosing, the 20th ele-
ment is automatically selected
The script saves, for each of the 5 variants and 20 parameters, the choice (position
in the sequence, absolute ordinal value and value).
13.4 Successive non-candidate rule
Input: 20-elements sequence, position pos ∈ [1, 5], parameter par ∈ [1, 20]
Output: value chosen according to the model
- Consider the candidate elements of the sequence, e.g. the values higher than
the pos highest value encountered so far
- Count how many successive non-candidates are encountered
- After par successive non-candidates, choose the ﬁrst following candidate
- If the last element of the sequence is reached without choosing, the 20th ele-
ment is automatically selected
The script saves, for each of the 5 variants and 20 parameters, the choice (position
in the sequence, absolute ordinal value and value).
13.5 Threshold model
Model without uncertainty
Part I - Identiﬁcation of the thresholds
Input: characteristics of the distribution (mean and standard deviation of the normal
distribution)
Output: sequence of thresholds
- Implicit: at round 20 every value will be accepted
- Round 19: every value above the mean (i.e. the expected value at this point)
will be accepted; compute the expected value of the right tail (above the
expected value) and the probability of randomly picking one number in the
left tail (below the expected value). The threshold is given by (probability of
left tail) · (expected value at round 20, i.e. the mean) + (probability of right
tail) · (expected value right tail)
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- Rounds 18-1: repeat the process considering the expected value of the following
round and updating expected value of the right tail and probability of being in
the left tail. Obtain remaining thresholds: (probability of left tail, considering
the expected value at the following round) · (expected value at the following
round) + (probability of right tail) · (expected value of the right tail)
Part II - Choice rule according to thresholds
Input: 20-elements sequence, Sequence of thresholds from previous part, Character-
istics of the distribution
Output: value chosen according to the model
- Rounds 1-19: compare the value with the corresponding threshold value. Ac-
cept only if the element of the sequence is higher than the threshold value
- If the distribution is not standardized, multiply the threshold value by the sd
and add the mean, then compare this value with the element of the sequence
- Round 20: accept any value
Model with uncertainty
Input: 20-elements sequence, sequence of thresholds from previous part, mean or
standard deviation of the distribution in case of partial information
Output: value chosen according to the model
- Implicit: never select the ﬁrst element of the sequence (not enough data to
estimate variance)
- At each round (from 2 to 20) consider only the share of the sequence seen so
far
- Estimate the parameters: mean and corrected standard deviation (or only one
if the other is known)
- Combine the parameters with the basic threshold values:
(threshold value · sd) + mean
- Compare this result with the corresponding element of the sequence. Choose
the element if it is higher than the updated threshold value
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- If the last element of the sequence is reached without choosing, the 20th ele-
ment is automatically selected
The script saves the choice (position in the sequence and value).
13.6 Tests of robustness
Part I - Preliminary steps
To test the robustness of the values adopted in the best threshold model, we insert
in the model an updating coeﬃcient m(k) close to 1 representing the uncertainty in
the value of the parameter/s as function of the remaining observations. We want to
verify if the threshold values we found are the best-performing ones, or if slightly
lower/higher values have better results.
Assigning a value to the parameter m(1), we compute m(k) = m(1)k, k ∈ [0, 19],
where k represents the number of observations left. The classic threshold value is
multiplied by m(k) and the element of the sequence is compared to this updated
threshold value
Input: 20-elements sequence, sequence of thresholds from previous part, value as-
signed to m(1) [we tested the interval 0.99-1.01 with 0.001 precision], mean or stan-
dard deviation of the distribution in case of partial information.
Output: value chosen according to the model
- At each round (from 2 to 20) consider only the share of the sequence seen so
far
- Estimate the parameters: mean and corrected standard deviation (or only one
if the other is known)
- Update threshold value multiplying by m(k), where k represents the number
of elements left
- Combine the parameters with the updated threshold values:
(threshold value · sd) + mean
- Compare this result with the corresponding element of the sequence. Choose
the element if it is higher than the updated threshold value
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- If the last element of the sequence is reached without choosing, the 20th ele-
ment is automatically selected
The script saves the choice (position in the sequence and value). Part II - Testing
robustness
Input: the same as before, using n=100.000 sequences; all the values of m(1) in the
interval to test (interval 0.99-1.01 with 0.001 precision)
Output: performance of the model in correspondence of each of the values of the
parameter
- Consider a value of m(1) and compute all m(k), k ∈ [0, 19]
- Run the n sequences as shown above, updating the threshold values with m(k)
- Save the average performance of the model with the assigned value of m(k)
- Repeat for all the values of m(1) in the interval
Results: we can ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence comparing the performance of the
model in the base version (m(1) = 1) and assigning to the parameter a value close
to one. This result can be explained by the limited number of times where this slight
change in the threshold causes a diﬀerent choice.
Considering values of m(1) in a broader interval we can recognize a signiﬁcant de-
crease in the score obtained, and plotting the performance as a function of the value
of m(1) we can clearly recognize a smooth curve with the maximum in correspon-
dence of m(1) = 1.
13.7 Cutoﬀ-threshold rule
Threshold sequence generated using estimation of mean and variance.
- Observe ﬁrst n = 5 elements without choosing them
- From the element in position n+ 1 on, estimate mean and standard deviation
and compare the element with a threshold value
- The threshold value is obtained as a sum of the estimated mean and the
estimated standard deviation multiplied by a coeﬃcient decreasing linearly
through the sequence (from 1.5 at i = 6 to 0 at i = 20)
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- Choose the ﬁrst elements above the corresponding threshold value
- If the last element of the sequence is reached without choosing, the 20th ele-
ment is automatically selected.
13.8 Maximum-threshold rule
Threshold sequence generated using estimation of mean and highest value encoun-
tered.
- Observe ﬁrst n = 5 elements without choosing them
- From the element in position n+1 on, estimate mean and consider the highest
value encountered so far, and compare the element with a threshold value
- The threshold value is obtained as a sum of the estimated mean and the
product between (the diﬀerence between the max and the estimated mean)
and (a coeﬃcient decreasing linearly through the sequence, from 1.5 at i=6 to
at i=20)
- Choose the ﬁrst elements above the corresponding threshold value
- If the last element of the sequence is reached without choosing, the 20th ele-
ment is automatically selected
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13.9 Generation of the sequences for the experiment
We want to check for a good randomization of the sequences to use for the experiment
in order to distinguish the models adopted.
Input: Characteristics required for the sequences to select (random position for the
best value, choices according to cutoﬀ rule and threshold model)
Output: Groups of sequences to use for the experiment
- Generate n = 100 sequences (20 elements randomly picked from a standardized
normal distribution)
- Create a matrix with the useful information of the sequences: position in the
sequence of the element chosen according to cutoﬀ rule (c) and threshold rule
(t), and highest element of the sequence(b), and diﬀerences of these positions
(c-b, t-b, c-t NOT in absolute value)
- Save in column (b) the position of the highest value of each sequence
- Save in column (c) the position of the value chosen according to cutoﬀ rule
(pos = 1, par = 7)
- Save in column (t) the position of the value chosen according to threshold
model
- Compute the diﬀerences: c-b, t-b, c-t
- Create a matrix ﬁlter, where each row represents a sequence, each column
a condition (distance between c and t, position of the best), and the value in
the cell is 0 (false) or 1 (true)
- Fill the matrix with the conditions (c-t: >2/<-2/ =0, position of best)
- Create a matrix type with the combinations of conditions that we want the
ﬁnal sequences to fulﬁll
- Combine type and ﬁlter, and save in ﬁnal the sequences
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